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Abstract 
This thesis concerns management of research and development (R&D) processes, with 
an emphasis on technology development and product development and their interplay. 
The aim is to assist companies in leveraging their R&D efforts and to improve the 
understanding of R&D management. Organizations’ capability to develop and integrate 
new technologies into commercialized products by using effective and repeatable 
processes plays a key role for competitiveness.  
Recent research has noted that the contracted term ‘R&D’ might, without care, beguile 
us into disregarding the inherent differences between aspects such as technology 
development and product development. While similar in some ways to the management 
of product development, technology development differs in its prerequisites, technical 
maturity, time horizon, need for competence, process repeatability, and completion 
point. These differences, entailing specific managerial issues and approaches, are taken 
account of in this thesis. Further, particular attention is given to the interplay of the two 
processes, an interplay that can either hinder R&D efforts or spur them to new heights. 
The chosen research path has been characterized by a practice-centered abductive 
design, building on studies related to knowledge transfer and technology integration, 
project management approaches, and organizational forms of R&D. A variety of 
methods has been used, ranging from company-wide surveys and in-depth case studies to 
development of hands-on project management techniques and tools. The research has 
been managerially oriented, conducted longitudinally and in close contact with foremost 
three companies (Ericsson Mobile Communications, Volvo Truck Corporation, and 
United Barcode Industries). 
The research findings belong mainly to two areas. One is the management of internal 
organizational interfaces, a crucial issue when commercializing new technology. Here, 
barriers and integration mechanisms have been analyzed, illustrated and explored. The 
other is management of technology development and product development scope, an 
issue of long-term strategic importance as well as vital for achieving timely deliveries. 
Within this area, a visual R&D content tool has been developed and tested, targeting 
R&D managers who work actively with the scope of projects and the related strategic 
implications throughout R&D execution. 
 
Keywords: Research and development, technology development, product development, 
management issues, integration, organizational interfaces, project scope 
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A. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
This thesis deals with management of research and development, with focus on 
technology development and product development as well as the interplay between them 
(the research focus is visualized in Exhibit 1). It is argued that the interrelated activities 
of technology development and product development differ with regard   to 
prerequisites, technical maturity, time horizon, competence needs, process repeatability, 
and completion point. Further, these differences entail different managerial problems of 
integration and differentiation, issues that need to be addressed in order to ensure 
efficient and effective utilization of R&D. 
 
Exhibit 1: Visualization of R&D-related work and surroundings (the ellipse represents the scope of this 
thesis). 
 
Managerial issues related to technology development, product development and their 
interplay have been studied in close relationship with UBI Printer, Volvo Truck 
Corporation, and Ericsson Mobile Communications. Methodological approaches have 
varied from broad surveys (e.g. the Volvo Truck Corporation study of technology 
transfer), to in-depth case studies (e.g. the Bluetooth study of Ericsson in Paper VI), and 
to more action-oriented approaches developing new tools and methods (e.g. the R&D 
content graphs in Paper V for managing project scope). 
This chapter states the overall purpose, presents and elaborates previous research1, and 
concludes with the framing of approached research issues. 
                                                 
1 All books referred to in this thesis will be noted with authors, year of publication (followed by a…z), and 
referenced page number, and articles will be referenced by authors and publication year. 
DEVELOPMENT
Engineering
Product development
RESEARCH
Basic research
Technology development
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A.1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
Many companies perceive research and development (R&D) as somewhat fuzzy, 
involving high uncertainty, with unclear rate of return, and troublesome to manage. On 
the other hand, companies that succeed at commercializing new technology in a rapid 
and precise manner achieve possibilities of attaining a greater market share, premium 
prices and dominant designs, leading to a much sharper competitive edge. The difference 
between success and failure is frequently found in the underlying management processes, 
more specifically in the interfaces between different development phases. Roberts 
(1979), for example, has long studied the movement of R&D results through 
organizations, declaring that most large companies are unsatisfied with the R&D 
outcome in terms of profitable products on the market. In line with this reasoning, Katz 
and Allen (1985, p. 391) state that an effective organization needs to cause the results of 
R&D to be appropriately transferred downstream. The capability to develop and 
integrate new technologies into commercialized products by using a rapid, repeatable, 
and effective process is at the foundation of competitiveness for industrial firms (Iansiti 
and West, 1997). 
This thesis deals with the management of R&D processes. This is done not only by 
focusing on technology development and product development, but also by aiming at 
understanding the interface between those processes. It is all in line with the reasoning of 
Iansiti (1993) who states: “a significant body of research has been completed on the 
management of research as well as on management of development, [while] there is less 
established understanding of their complex interaction”. Properly managing R&D 
processes has long been a matter of debate and considered a troublesome area with no 
simple answers; ranging from an Achilles’ heel in some firms to the sole basis of 
competition for others, many of the differences have contributed to R&D management 
issues (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p. 1; Smith and Reinertsen, 1991, p. 170). By properly 
managing R&D processes, companies can reach an increase in lead-time precision, 
increased quality of final products, and reduced development cost. Overall, companies’ 
competitive advantage can be strengthened as placed efforts are managed in a leaner 
manner and more aligned with overall business strategy. 
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Overall purpose 
The perspective on managing R&D processes has changed over the years, moving from a 
technology-centered model to a more interaction-focused view. Simultaneously, the 
contribution of R&D to companies’ overall competitiveness seems to have increased in 
importance. Many companies have expressed frustration over not gaining sufficient rates 
of return on their R&D spending – highlighting the management of R&D processes as a 
vital area of improvement. Recent research goes one step further, appointing 
integrational issues between different areas of expertise as explanatory reasons. In 
particular, the interface between technology development and product development has 
been characterized as showing a high potential for improvement (e.g. Iansiti, 1997), yet is 
studied by few. Earlier research has typically focused predominantly on R&D 
management as a whole – neglecting the differences. 
Hence, this thesis explores management of R&D processes with special attention to 
technology development, product development2, and their interplay. Research issues 
approached can be classified into two major domains: managing internal organizational 
interfaces when introducing new technology, and management of technology 
development and product development scope. The study is conducted in order to explore 
and increase the understanding of management of R&D processes in manufacturing 
firms, while also delivering industrially valuable insights and methods. 
A.2. FIVE GENERATIONS OF R&D MANAGEMENT 
R&D has been studied for a long time within different contexts, economies, and 
environmental demands throughout the years. The transition from early days’ booming 
markets and economic growth in the 1950s to today’s highly competitive and global 
marketplace is reflected in the way R&D has been managed. Early success stories such as 
the industrial research laboratories Bell Labs, Xerox Parc and Lockheed Martin 
Skunkworks have been replaced by companies like the more market-focused 3M, the 
rapid introductions of new product ranges from Japanese manufacturers like Toyota and 
Sony, and R&D collaborations like Ericsson’s network of companies around the 
“Bluetooth” technology and standard. 
                                                 
2 It is worth noticing that these two processes are interrelated, sometimes hard to distinguish, not to be 
seen as functioning sequential and sometimes being in part or in whole conducted by external parties, 
emphasizing the need to consider them simultaneously. 
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The perspective on R&D processes has been different throughout the years, since the 
structure and prerequisites of the economy have changed and so has the presumption of 
best practice. One attempt at describing the last fifty years of evolution within the R&D 
field is shown in Exhibit 2. Worth noticing is that these five models of R&D generations, 
though presented on a time scale, hold components or ideas still valid and sought for by 
many companies, and hence do not represent a map of where companies today are to be 
placed. Throughout these periods, different industries or companies have functioned as 
role models or drivers of best practice, a phenomenon that can also be recognized from 
research results. 
 
R&D Generations  Context Process Characteristics 
First generation 
Black hole demand 
(1950 to mid- 1960s) 
R&D as ivory tower, technology-push oriented, 
seen as an overhead cost, having little or no 
interaction with the rest of the company or overall 
strategy. Focus on scientific breakthroughs. 
Second generation 
Market shares battle 
(mid-1960s to 
early 1970s) 
R&D as business, market-pull oriented, and 
strategy-driven from the business side, all under 
the umbrella of project management and the 
internal customer concept. 
Third generation 
Rationalization efforts
(mid-1970s to 
mid-1980s) 
R&D as portfolio, moving away from individual 
projects view, and with linkages to both business 
and corporate strategies. Risk-reward and similar 
methods guide the overall investments. 
Fourth generation 
Time-based struggle 
(early 1980s to 
mid-1990s) 
R&D as integrative activity, learning from and 
with customers, moving away from a product 
focus to a total concept focus, where activities are 
conducted in parallel by cross-functional teams. 
Fifth generation Systems integration (mid-1990s onward) 
R&D as network, focusing on collaboration 
within a wider system – involving competitors, 
suppliers, distributors, etc. The ability to control 
product development speed is imperative, 
separating R from D. 
Exhibit 2: Description of five generations of R&D processes (developed and adapted from Roussel, 1991, 
p. 39; Rothwell, 1994; Miller and Morris, 1998, p. 19; and Chiesa, 2001, p. 12). 
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During the first generation of R&D (1950 to mid-1960s), most of the new products that 
were produced were also sold, new industries emerged, and technology was generally 
seen as the remedy for all ailments (Rothwell, 1994; Pelz and Andrews, 1966). This first 
generation of R&D worked under the assumption that the more R&D went in, the more 
products came out. In short, R&D was seen as an overhead cost (Roussel et al., p. 26). 
With regard to the R&D process, it was viewed as linear and as focused on pushing 
technology downstream towards the marketplace (e.g. Quinn and Mueller, 1963) – a 
marketplace characterized by a demand matching or sometimes exceeding the supply. 
During the second generation of R&D (mid-1960s to early 1970s), the supply and 
demand were in a more stable relationship, competition was intensified, and more 
emphasis was placed on marketing efforts to increase the sales volume (Rothwell, 1994). 
Within this environment, more focus was placed on the short-term demand side, 
neglecting long-term research in favor of ideas from the market. Process-wise, the 
market-pull effect was strengthened and the process was seen somewhat oppositely as 
compared to the first generation of R&D – i.e. ideas originated from the market, to be 
refined and developed by R&D (e.g. von Hippel, 1976). Project management was also 
introduced to direct and monitor the R&D efforts, and the business side as the internal 
customer of R&D was highlighted (Miller and Morris, 1998, p. 13). 
Further, the third generation of R&D can be discerned during the period of the mid-
1970s to mid-1980s, when the economy was shivering with high rates of inflation and 
demand saturation (Rothwell, 1994). Cost control and cost reduction became the name 
of the game (Miller and Morris, 1998, p. 15), leading R&D to eliminate wasteful efforts 
by reviewing and improving the way new technology was developed and monitored 
within the company (e.g. Galbraith, 1973; Allen, 1977; Roberts and Frohman, 1978). This 
strong process-focus resulted in a more linked and interaction-focused view of R&D 
(instead of the two extremes as before), tying the technological capabilities more closely 
together with the market needs. The portfolio view of R&D also resulted in numerous 
ways of balancing the risk-reward continuum of probability of technical and market 
success (Roussel, 1984; Cooper, 1983). 
The next identified period ranged from the early 1980s to mid-1990s, when the economy 
recovered and business people rethought their diversification strategies in favor of 
returning to their core business, all under a time-based competition paradigm driven by 
Japan and companies like Toyota, Sony, and Honda (Rothwell, 1994). Overall, the 
automotive industry was heavily benchmarked and functioned as a role model for many 
(Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992; Aoshima, 1994). The focus 
shifted from developing products to putting the product in a total business concept, 
including also for example services, distribution, and multi-product platforms (Miller and 
Morris, 1998, p. 274). With regard to the R&D process, the new product development 
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process was highlighted, and the integration and parallelization of activities were brought 
forward as success factors when striving for speed (Trygg, 1991; Eldred and McGrath, 
1997; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995). 
Finally, the predicted fifth3 generation of R&D broadens the boundaries for companies’ 
R&D activities, all in the light of increased global competition, rapid technological 
change, and the need for sharing heavy technology investments (Rothwell, 1994). Hence, 
R&D needs to interact with the business environment, e.g. competitors, distributors, 
customers, suppliers, etc., placing more emphasis on the ability to coordinate and 
integrate systems from different parties (e.g. Iansiti and West, 1997). Examples of this 
type of rapid system integration are companies from the computer hardware and 
software industry, e.g. Microsoft Corporation, Netscape Corporation, and Dell 
Corporation (MacCormack, Verganti, and Iansiti, 2001; Tushman and O´Reilly, 1999). 
Further, the ability not only to be speedy in product development, but also to control the 
speed and thus be timely, is in even stronger focus. In line with this logic, reducing the 
uncertainty due to development by separating the more research-oriented tasks is one 
common approach, strengthening the need for efficient and effective integration of a 
coherent whole. 
To summarize, the five-fold classification indicates that the perspective on R&D 
processes is changing, adapting to the surrounding context and prerequisites, and that 
R&D processes can be a source of vital competitive advantage when facing those 
changes. The challenge for companies to stay profitable is tougher than ever. Hence, 
being a fast and timely innovator by bringing new technology successfully to the market 
is seen as an increasingly important factor determining a company’s competitiveness in 
markets where product life cycles are short and the rate of technological change is high 
(Iansiti and West, 1997). 
Managerial approaches 
The management of R&D has changed throughout the years, moving from an isolated 
view to a more connected and complex situation to handle. The previous section 
classified and described overall perspectives on R&D processes, using a time scale. This 
section describes in more detail, and in a more dynamic and coupled manner, the 
managerial approaches and company responses related to those R&D environments. 
Managing R&D processes involves several challenges for firms – e.g. strategic, 
operational, and methodological. Traditionally, the amount that companies spend on 
                                                 
3 Equivalent to the description by Miller & Morris (1998) of their fourth-generation R&D model with 
innovation as the company’s responsibility and not constrained by the traditional company boundary. 
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R&D has been used by business analysts as an indicator of competitiveness, i.e. similar to 
the first-generation R&D discussed in the previous section (Badawy, 1989). However, 
Badawy (1989) states that many companies have had great success in developing new 
technology, though not in managing it to result in commercially successful products. 
Iansiti (1997) argues further that the R&D spending is less important than “a company’s 
process for rapidly and efficiently translating its R&D efforts into products that excel in 
satisfying the market’s needs [which] is much more important”. Nevertheless, even though 
the challenges in managing R&D and R&D processes have changed throughout the 
years, some issues have stood their ground, and others have arisen. This view is more 
cumulative and evolution-oriented in contrast to the static description of the five 
generations of R&D presented in Exhibit 2. This dynamic view is presented in Exhibit 3, 
where not only the five generations are noted, but also the related company responses 
and examples of associated managerial approaches. 
1st
3rd
4th
5th
2nd
Corporate
research labs
Business unit
development
R&D projects
Cross-functional
projects
Cross-boundary
alliances
R&D Generations Company response Managerial approaches
- Involving company network
- Focusing integration of systems
- Separating / linking R and D
- Parallelizing activities
- Involving suppliers & lead customers
- Integrating R&D and manufacturing
- Structuring R&D processes
- Evaluating long-term technology strategies
- Integrating R&D and marketing
- Appointing internal customers
- Ideas gathered from market
- Stimulating scientific advances
- Choosing location after competencies
 
Exhibit 3: Visualization of five generations of R&D management from the early 1950s until today, related 
company responses, and examples of associated managerial approaches. 
 
Exhibit 3 moves away from describing the characteristics of each generation, to 
discussing the company responses and related managerial approaches, all in a potentially 
cumulative manner. Today, industries and firms struggle with a mixture of the noted 
responses and approaches, all depending on, for example, history, context, and market. 
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The company reaction related to the first generation of R&D was to create corporate 
research labs, labs where technology could flourish and where main managerial 
challenges were to decide the geographical location of the labs and to stimulate scientific 
advances (Quinn and Mueller, 1963). The characteristics of the second generation of 
R&D were typically handled by incorporating R&D into the business unit. Ideas were 
gathered from the market, and internal customers of each R&D task were appointed at 
the firm, all in order to secure closeness to the market. Further, the characteristics of the 
third generation of R&D were met with a stronger focus on the R&D projects, 
introducing portfolio and project management techniques and structured design methods 
to improve the efficiency. Long-term strategies were evaluated and analyses were made 
of the consequences of the choices; further, the integration of the R&D function with the 
market was in focus. The fourth generation of R&D introduced the concept of lead 
customers, parallelized activities, and involved suppliers in the development efforts in an 
attempt to bring in other perspectives for increased cross-functionality. Finally, the fifth 
generation of R&D is met by firms taking on a cross-boundary alliance strategy, 
involving the company network in both research and development, and linking research 
to development to enhance the overall precision. 
The integration dilemma is clearly evident as a contemporary management issue, 
involving integration of systems and processes to deliver a coherent and effective whole. 
A noted trend of separation between research and development (cf. Chiesa, 2001, p. 173; 
Corso, Muffatto, and Verganti, 1999) to reduce uncertainty and gain speed has placed 
even tougher demands on managing and integrating R&D processes, a challenge which is 
the main focus of this thesis. Eldred and McGrath (1997b) note, for example, that the 
key to more effective R&D is improving its underlying management process – a 
challenge that is even more intense when separating, or otherwise balancing, research 
and development efforts. There has, however, been limited research on the interaction 
between research and development, especially under the prerequisites of today. 
Consequently, this thesis deals with management of R&D processes, with a special focus 
on the interplay between technology development and product development in 
manufacturing firms. Previous research, as well as practitioners, has highlighted the link 
between technology development and product development within the R&D umbrella as 
crucial, and an often neglected issue, when creating and sustaining a successful flow of 
new technology to the market. This statement, combined with the perceived need of 
companies to increase the rate of return on technology development, argues for the area 
to be worth exploring further. The integration of technology development and product 
development may have been present throughout the first five generations of R&D, but 
its importance and actuality has been amplified during the latter generations, due to the 
increased time pressure, the need of higher precision, and the tougher system-integration 
tasks facing companies in today’s context. Hence, having a well-functioning interaction 
 
 
 9
between technology development and product development can increase lead-time 
precision, increase the quality of products launched at the marketplace, reduce 
development cost, and become a foundation for competitive advantage as placed efforts 
are more aligned with overall business strategy. 
A.3. DEPICTING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT 
In this section the terms used in the thesis are clarified and defined and the differences, 
as well as the linkage, between technology development and product development are 
highlighted and discussed. 
Clarification of terms used 
There is a multitude of different definitions and uses of language for R&D depending on, 
for example, type of industry, history, academic research domain, purposes etc. Terms 
flourish such as basic or fundamental research (e.g. Goldman and McKenzie, 1965), 
applied or targeted research (e.g. Autio and Laamanen, 1995), advanced engineering 
(e.g. Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p. 26), product development (e.g. Cooper, 1983), product 
engineering (e.g. Clausing, 1994, p. 338), engineering (e.g. Babcock, 1991, p. 2), and 
technical services (e.g. Allen, Lee, and Tushman, 1980) – all related to R&D and 
meaning different things to different researchers and/or companies (Exhibit 4). Hence, a 
clarification of terms and meanings is necessary. 
Exhibit 4: Visualization of R&D-related work and surroundings. 
 
DEVELOPMENT
Engineering
Product development
RESEARCH
Basic research
Technology development
 
 
Exhibit 4 visualizes R&D-related activities and the surrounding context4. The following 
are characterizations, related to the model above, of R&D-related work5: 
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 Basic research (fundamental research): Basic research is experimental or theoretical
work undertaken primarily to acquire new knowledge of the underlying phenomena
and observable facts, without any particular application or use in view. 
Technology development (applied research, advanced engineering): Technology
development is investigation undertaken in order to acquire new knowledge, though
directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective – developing ideas into
operational form.  
Product development (development): Product development is systematic work
drawing on existing knowledge gained from research and practical experience,
directed towards producing new materials, products and devices and towards installing
new processes, systems and services. 
Engineering (product engineering, technical services): Engineering is systematic work
directed towards improving already installed processes, systems and services, or
produced materials, products and devices.  10
urther, when it comes to managing R&D processes, the definition can be divided into 
wo basic blocks, i.e. management and R&D processes. These basic blocks have been 
ound to be defined in a respectively consistent manner, and two well-referenced works 
ithin the field have been chosen as representing examples and sources (Fayol 1949 and 
othwell 1994). Babcock’s (1991, p. 12) review of Fayol’s (1949) work refers to 
anagement as consisting of the elements “control, organize, and plan”, elements that 
re noted by Babcock, as by Koontz et al. (1986, p. 35), to have “proven remarkably 
seful and durable over the decades6”. Controlling means ensuring that events conform to 
he prepared plan, while organizing involves intentional establishment of roles, 
tructures, and interactions throughout the work. Further, R&D processes have been 
                                                
 This visualization is not to be seen as matching the sequences, relations, tasks, characteristics or the like 
elated to R&D. This is a mental map aiding description of the scope of the thesis. It is agreed that there 
re several interdependencies, company boundaries, difficulties in framing the different tasks, etc. which 
re not captured in this visualization. 
 Adapted from the National Science Foundation (1993). 
 These three dimensions are similar to Ellis (1997, p. 64): plan, organize, lead, evaluate, control; and to 
rucker’s (1999) view of basic elements of management work: plan, organize, integrate, measure, and 
evelop people – the latter as distinct from the human-development dimension. 
 
 
 11
studied by many, though defined by few – Smith and Reinertsen (1991, p. 119) declare in 
general terms that the R&D process covers what will be done, when, and by whom. One 
recent, more detailed, attempt is made by Chiesa (2001), who discusses the main 
elements as being leadership, resourcing, systems and tools, and technology acquisition. 
Consequently, this thesis views R&D through the movement and transfer of new 
technology across internal organizational interfaces; it targets applied research and 
development by using the terms “technology development” and “product development”; 
further, it does not specifically address manufacturing process-related work or market-
related work. Managing R&D processes is also noted to involve controlling, organizing, 
and planning of elements such as leadership, resourcing, system and tools, and 
technology acquisition. 
How technology development differs from product development 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002) remark that the contracted term “R&D” might, without 
care, beguile us into disregarding the inherent differences of the tasks concerned, tasks 
that entail different managerial problems. Hence, R&D could be viewed and divided in 
several ways, for example as consisting of two major dimensions with different 
characteristics and aims: one exploration-oriented and one exploitation-oriented part 
(Katz and Allen, 1985, p. 390). In this thesis, the exploration-oriented part matches 
technology development (research) and the exploitation-oriented part matches product 
development (development). The former develops technological capabilities, and the 
latter exploits those capabilities to generate a range of products. 
Technology development and product development are two deeply interrelated 
activities, although with some fundamental differences (White, 1982; Sheasley, 1999; 
Eldred and McGrath, 1997a). There are several dimensions where technology 
development differs from product development in terms of task characteristics – namely 
prerequisites, technical maturity, time horizon, competence needs, process repeatability, 
and completion point (Iansiti and West, 1997; Kusunoki, 1992). Kusunoki (1992), like 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann (2002), argues for example that most research has been done by 
viewing R&D as a whole, neglecting these inherent and critical differences. Technology 
development is more problem- and concept-centric, while product development pursues 
solutions and needs on a more detailed level (Exhibit 5). 
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Dimension Technology 
development 
Product 
development 
Prerequisites 
Problem-focused, often unclear 
and with a fuzzy target. 
Solution-focused, and clearer in 
terms of targeted market niches as 
well as appointed development 
resources. 
Technical maturity 
The technology is to be evaluated 
and developed; problems are more 
of a component nature. 
Major technological concepts are 
framed and chosen; the challenge 
is more of an integrative and 
systemic nature. 
Time horizon 
More long-term, e.g. targeting the 
product portfolio of tomorrow. 
Ranging over a shorter period of 
time. 
Competence needs 
Unclear, depending on the nature 
of the problems, and harder to 
proactively schedule in time. 
Clearer, project-based, and easier 
to predict. 
Process repeatability 
Low; greater uncertainty involved, 
and uniqueness, result in elusive 
processes with low commonality. 
Higher; the process shows more 
routine tasks and is easier to 
formalize. 
Completion point 
Unclear; missions can be to build 
knowledge, or to demonstrate a 
certain technology feasibility level.
Sharp, ending with 
commercialization and launching 
of new products on the market. 
Exhibit 5: Examples of differences in task characteristics between technology development and product 
development in relation to each other (synthesized from Leifer and Triscari, 1987; Clark and Fujimoto, 
1991, p. 169; Kusunoki 1992; Clausing 1992, pp. 317-341; Sheasley 1999). 
 
Further, these differences taken together are the basis on which researchers argue to 
separate the two tasks from each other, e.g. culturally, resource-wise, management- as 
well as location-wise (Chiesa 2001, p. 173; Iansiti, 1997). The inherently different logics of 
the parts of R&D incline us to separately manage technology development and product 
development in order to gain efficiency and clarity7 (cf. Allen et al., 1980). For example, 
                                                 
7 It should also be noted that several different degrees of separation are possible, for example, 
organizational, cultural, procedural, and legal. 
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Eldred and McGrath (1997b) argue that products utilizing new technology require a 
technology development phase prior to, or in parallel with, product development. 
Separating technology development and product development is also a noted trend (cf. 
Chiesa, 2001, p. 175; Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, p. 38) and a frequently used way of 
reducing the uncertainty and increasing the manageability of R&D in manufacturing 
firms (Chiesa, 2001, p. 173). Summarizing reasons for considering a separation of 
technology development from product development: 
• To increase the manageability of R&D, i.e. being able to apply different types of 
management adapted to the respective logics (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p. 167). 
• To reduce the uncertainty of R&D, i.e. decreasing the complexity and risk by 
developing technology off the critical path of product development, thereby 
enhancing precision (Magnusson, 1999). 
• To raise the quality of the final product, i.e. by introducing well-prepared and 
tested new technology in a deliberate manner to the product development projects 
(Clausing, 1994, p. 317). 
However, there are also reported drawbacks to conducting such a task division (cf. 
Zedtwitz and Gassmann, 2002; Magnusson, 2000). According to Lawrence and Lorsch 
(1969), the more a company differentiates, the more it needs to integrate in order to end 
up with a coherent, effective whole. Hence, if a task division is not conducted, a high 
degree of complexity is expected to be found within the R&D environment, although the 
gain might be a lesser need of integration mechanisms between the two parts. This might 
be suitable for a certain dynamic environment where, for example, the holistic, 
integrative, and simultaneous consideration of both technology development and 
product development is essential (cf. Magnusson, 1999, discussing the Toshiba 
Corporation case). 
Linking technology development and product development 
Whether technology development and product development are integratively managed 
to minimize potential barriers, or separated to increase efficiency, the interaction 
between technology development and product development has been regarded by 
several researchers as troublesome, yet crucial (e.g. Chiesa, 2001, p. 173). In the light of 
its industrial importance, Clausing (1994, p. 19) claims that one of the major cash drains 
of R&D occurs when new technology concepts are inadequately transferred into the 
development of a specific product. Similarly, McGrath and Eldred (1997a) argue that the 
inability to properly manage technology development and link it to product development 
is frequently the culprit behind many costly delays. Linking technology development to 
product development involves many dimensions: design of the overall R&D process to 
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enable interaction (e.g. synchronize strategies and schedules), decisions regarding 
staffing and potential rotation of personnel, methods or mechanisms to use in the 
interplay, and connection with the surrounding network to secure access to necessary 
knowledge. 
A.4. RESEARCH ISSUES 
Throughout the years, the five identified generations of R&D (see section A.2) have 
faced a certain set of managerial issues. These issues have evolved, diminished or grown 
in importance and actuality. The dynamic R&D process involving the movement and 
transfer of new technology intra-organizational interfaces has been highlighted as 
complex and troublesome to manage. Especially the interplay between technology 
development and product development has been stated to have large potential for 
improvement, affecting companies’ bottom-line results. The purpose of this thesis is to 
explore managerial R&D process issues related to technology development and product 
development as well as their interplay, issues that have grown in importance during the 
later identified generations of R&D.  The specific set of issues that has been approached 
in this thesis can roughly be placed into two main categories: aspects related to managing 
internal organizational interfaces when introducing new technology, and aspects related 
to managing technology development and product development scope. 
Managing internal organizational interfaces 
The effective and efficient management of interfaces is crucial for larger manufacturing 
firms with internal R&D capabilities. The term “interfaces” refers to boundaries 
between functions (e.g. between research and development, or between cab and chassis) 
or between different R&D phases (e.g. between technology development and product 
development). Previous investigations within the field that have functioned as a basis for 
this category and this thesis are: 
 
 
 
• The communication-based studies led by Allen (cf. Allen, Lee, and Tushman, 
1980). This stream of research has characterized the internal interfaces within 
R&D as troublesome, though primarily focusing on the interfaces between R&D 
and other functions such as production or marketing (cf. Souder and 
Padmanabhan, 1989; Trygg, 1991). Further, the gatekeeper concept was 
introduced and elaborated (Allen, 1971); the gatekeeper receives information 
from a wide variety of sources, and acts as an information source for his group (an 
intermediate role). 
• The integration mechanism studies of Roberts (cf. Roberts, 1979) identified the 
input to the R&D process and the downstream linkages as a potential hindrance to 
efficient and effective commercialization. This work resulted, among other things, 
in categorizing and presenting three integration mechanisms (termed “bridges”), 
i.e. one organizational, one procedural, and one human-based approach – all in 
order to overcome the identified problem that much excellent research is never 
used. 
• The technology integration studies initiated by Iansiti (cf. Iansiti and West, 1997) 
were among the first that really pinpointed the interaction between research and 
development as crucial to management, highlighting the integration tasks and the 
space between technology creation and exploitation as critical. The focus was on 
the process of integrating technologies, moving away from a linear research and 
development view to an iterative view. Further, the main industry in focus was the 
rapidly evolving computer and software field. The managerial approach suggested 
is based on setting up a technology integration team, i.e. a team responsible for 
preparing and making the decisions of what technologies to integrate and how to 
make them function in a systems product.  
The research presented above provides a foundation for the studies in this thesis within 
the category of managing internal interfaces. To be more specific, aspects of the 
following issue have been approached in the thesis: 
 
I
b
i
 [R1] How can the interplay between technology development and product development
be managed, and potentially improved?  15
ssues not fully answered by previous research involve simultaneous consideration of 
oth sides of research and development when considering technology development and 
nternal transfer to product development. 
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Managing technology development and product development scope 
Managing technology development and product development scope is also a delicate 
task, involving factors affecting, for example, technology content in released products, 
timeliness and project costs, and the overall product and project complexity (cf. Karlsson 
and Åhlström, 1999). The terms “technology development” and “product development 
scope” refer to the project content in terms of degree of newness, technological risks and 
opportunities, strategic importance for the firm, etc. Previous investigations within the 
field that have functioned as a basis for this category and this thesis are: 
• The research conducted chiefly within the automotive industry by Clark, 
Wheelwright, and Fujimoto (cf. Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Wheelwright and Clark, 
1992). This extensive research introduced, for example, new ways of organizing 
(e.g. the heavyweight product manager), elaborated upon Japanese managerial 
principles moving away from giant technological steps to a more incrementally 
based perspective, and emphasized the importance of lead time. 
• The portfolio perspective was highlighted with the work of Roussel, Saad, and 
Erickson (cf. Roussel, 1984), providing guidance to management of the overall 
R&D efforts in a strategic manner. The work resulted for instance in several 
graphical views of R&D, typically framed by dimensions such as technological 
maturity and probability of success or risk, and was exemplified via a food 
ingredients company. 
• The work by Eldred, McGrath, Smith and Reinertsen (cf. Eldred and McGrath, 
1997a; Smith and Reinertsen, 1991), researchers and experienced consultants, has 
resulted in techniques and working methods aimed at improving the management 
of R&D. The risk of missing deadlines due to a misbalanced project effort in terms 
of technological content or newness is pinpointed. A process guiding in this 
respect is suggested, focusing on overall synchronization of R&D efforts, 
technology equalization (i.e. not only developing the core technology, but also 
securing necessary supporting technologies), and technology transfer 
management. 
The research presented above provides a foundation for the studies in this thesis within 
the category of managing technology development and product development scope. 
Issues not fully answered by previous research involve the continuous and dynamic 
management of the R&D scope (including assimilation of new methods), i.e. assisting not 
only the strategists but also individual project managers within companies. To be more 
specific, aspects of the following research issue have been approached within the thesis: 
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 [R2] How can the R&D project scope be managed in a structured and continuous
manner throughout project execution?  17
spects of the two main R&D issues R1 and R2 are approached in Papers I–VII. It is not 
y intention, nor within the scope of this thesis, to provide general solutions in each of 
he two categories, but merely to explore aspects thereof and to provide insight and 
xamples of thinking and acting on these issues. 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
This chapter starts with a presentation and discussion of the research paradigm and 
tradition, follows on to a more detailed description of the conducted studies and 
associated companies, and ends with an analysis of the methods used as well as a 
discussion on the quality of data and alternative approaches. 
B.1. RESEARCH PARADIGM AND TRADITION 
A research paradigm8 expresses the world-view, the perceptions of scientific research, 
and the relation to scientific and ethical values of the researcher (Törnebohm, 1974, p. 2). 
The research paradigm in turn influences the choice of methodological approach. The 
research at the Department of Operations Management and Work Organization at 
Chalmers University of Technology has traditionally been conducted in close 
cooperation with industry, by methods commonly using deep longitudinal case studies 
from a theoretical starting point of sociotechnical systems (cf. Karlsson, 1979). This is 
most likely a result of financial industrial support, the relatively free and open access to 
Swedish companies, and the pursuit of operational and industrially viable research 
results. The Ph.D. candidates at the department all come from an engineering 
background; the underlying perspective and the view of research are thereby heavily 
influenced. As a former colleague states: “being an engineer is being normative” 
(Lundqvist, 1996, p. 15), resulting in aiming not only to generate new theory but also to 
generate implications for management. This background has strongly guided and 
affected my world-view and beliefs as to how to conduct research and what constitutes 
good research. In short, this forms the research paradigm of the thesis, resulting in a 
pragmatic approach embracing a mixture of traditional positivist and constructivist 
approaches (cf. Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998, p. 3). 
Further, the research results throughout the Ph.D. period are frequently discussed with 
and evaluated by industry; for example, each industry project is typically supervised and 
guided by a steering committee using a milestone approach. This way of working leads to 
a fair amount of time spent on site in order to get the necessary contextual knowledge. 
This close relationship, usually to managers, naturally sets its mark on the research being 
conducted as well as the results achieved. The practice-oriented work performed may 
therefore not be very conceptual or aggregated, and can be accused of being too 
                                                 
8 A paradigm can be said to hold four components, i.e. the researcher’s knowledge and related 
assumptions, interests, personal driving force, and abilities to act according to orientation (cf. Törnebohm, 
1994). 
 
 
 19
simplistic or case-specific; however, the value of being close to the studied phenomenon, 
resulting in insights and lessons well grounded in practice, is high. It is then up to the 
managers in other companies to apply the experiences and theories within their own 
contexts and realities. The approach is similar with the action research paradigm (cf. 
Foster, 1972), although different in the sense that there are seldom stated deliverables; 
neither am I measuring or involved in the actual process of change itself. 
Examples of previous research conducted at the department are the work by Karlsson 
(1979), Lindér (1990), Lindberg (1990), Tunälv (1991) and Almgren (1999), all of whom 
have been studying production systems and manufacturing strategies, typically in the 
automotive industry. Other examples within the product development domain are 
Carlsson (1990), Trygg (1991), Lundqvist (1996), and Sundgren (1998), who have studied 
the integration of technical functions, efficiency and organizing aspects, and product 
platform development, typically from a managerial point of view. Most of the work has 
also been conducted from a contingency-based perspective, where the notions are deeply 
rooted that there is no best way to organize and that applying a holistic view is central to 
understanding. 
B.2. EVOLUTION AND SCOPE OF THE STUDIES 
The data underlying this thesis come from three longitudinal research projects in the 
manufacturing industry: the UBI Printer study (UBI), the Volvo Truck Corporation 
study (VTC), and the Ericsson Mobile Communications study (ECS). When it comes to 
the previous characterization of different R&D generations (see section A.1), I am not 
able to position the respective three studies in this thesis as acting entirely within a 
certain generation. Each study acts instead within a mixture of the characterizations. In 
order to roughly position the context and environment of the three studies, examples of 
characteristics (at the time of each study) from each study are provided below9: 
UBI Printer. The R&D environment at UBI Printer is characterized by a strongly 
resource-constrained business view, where the electrical and mechanical platforms are 
updated in sequence. There is a focus on individual project management, equivalent to 
the second-generation R&D, though the overall platform thinking better matches the 
elements of the third generation. Further, the customers or suppliers are not taking a 
major part in the R&D efforts. In sum, the R&D environment at UBI Printer 
corresponds to a mixture of the second and third generations of R&D. 
                                                 
9 This is not to be seen as a characterization based on scientifically gathered data, but merely as guidance to 
the reader. 
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Volvo Truck Corporation. The R&D activity at VTC, in terms of funding, is seen as an 
overhead cost, similar to the first generation of R&D; but there is an element of portfolio 
thinking from the third generation, with movement towards a total concept offering, and 
more importantly there is a high degree of involvement from the suppliers in R&D – 
matching the basic level of fifth-generation R&D. Consequently, the R&D activities at 
VTC constitute a mixture of several different generations of R&D. 
Ericsson Mobile Communications. The R&D efforts at ECS, or more specifically in the 
Bluetooth unit and the parent organization, have a high degree of collaboration with 
competitors, suppliers, complementary services companies, and customers – well 
targeting the fifth generation of R&D. The portfolio thinking in terms of working with 
platforms is well spread; less spread are risk-reward analysis and evaluation systems of 
the third generation of R&D. Hence, the R&D efforts at ECS match a first attempt 
towards the fifth generation of R&D. 
The three studies can to some extent be categorized or viewed by using the five 
generations of R&D classification, though not yielding a one-to-one match but rather 
constituting a mixture thereof. Further, the resulting seven papers (apart from three 
confidential company reports) are attached as Papers I–VII. 
 
Exhibit 6: Overview of conducted research projects and Papers I–VII (circles with Roman numerals 
indicate respective papers). 
 
Exhibit 6 briefly reviews the scope of the conducted research projects. All seven papers 
deal with the management of, and interplay between, technology development and 
product development. The three studies, labeled UBI, VTC, and ECS, are summarized 
below. The scope of the research was at first to explore the early phases of product 
development. This study led to the insight that the foundation of a successful flow of 
Early phases in product development
Parts sharing in product developmentUnited Barcode Industries
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Volvo Truck Corporation
Ericsson Mobile Communications
Early phases in product development
Evaluating Virtual Reality
Organizing applied research
Project scope method and tool
Linking applied research
Ambidextrous organization
I II
III V
VI VII
IV
 
 
 21
technology is dependent on the planning, execution, and preparation of technology 
development even before the product development project has begun. Further, the scope 
of the research was broadened not only to include technology development, but also to 
extend the initial project management perspective to incorporate the dimensions of 
integration and differentiation and the management of knowledge. 
The United Barcode Industries study 
The United Barcode Industries (UBI) study started out during February of 1997, initially 
focusing on differences between the formal model for conducting product development 
and the informal process actually in use at United Barcode Industries Corporation. The 
work concentrated on longitudinally following the development of a new technology 
platform for the next-generation product family of barcode printers (Exhibit 7). Overall, 
the focus was on the interface between technology development and product 
development. 
 
Exhibit 7: Example of a typical barcode printer from UBI Printer (Intermec’s EasyCoder 601XP). 
 
The project involved 14 persons (excluding consultants), lasted for 18 months, and had 
weekly half-day coordination meetings of which I attended approximately 70%. The 
interaction with the project leader and the team was extensive (e.g. during project 
meetings and research presentations) and the access to information (e.g. project minutes, 
blueprints, roadmaps, surveys) was unrestricted and freely shared. The research 
questions studied were the design, set-up, and execution of the early phases in product 
development (Paper I), and the managerial difficulties associated with sharing 
technology and parts across different generations (Paper II).  
The UBI project overlapped the VTC project in time, enabling a multi-case study 
approach for both research tasks. What was revealed during the studies of the early 
phases was that the industry ought to adapt different front-end process models 
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depending, at least, on the respective project characteristics – contrary to the ongoing 
academic search for the optimal model. Further, some basic building blocks of the early 
phases were identified, providing guidance for practitioners. The second paper focused 
on the transfer management and sharing of parts between different models, a way of 
working that has long been considered as good design practice and an easy task. 
However, the study revealed complex managerial challenges that could be categorized 
into organizational, strategic, technology and cost, and support system-related issues. 
The complexity and difficulties found in Paper II spurred the interest into technology 
transfer and integration dilemmas. The UBI project was concluded during late spring of 
1998, covering the early phases of the next-generation project as well as the detailed 
design phases (excluding the pilot production run). 
The Volvo Truck Corporation study 
The Volvo Truck Corporation (VTC) study started out during the summer of 1997 with a 
pre-study divided into two parts: one industrial and one theoretically based, both 
focusing on the early phases of product development at Volvo Truck Corporation 
(resulting in a company internal report entitled “Concept Development”). Three 
improvement areas (internal technology transfer, pre-development activities, and 
decision-making support), suitable for further research, were identified during 
approximately 25 interviews with managers and engineers from different departments 
involved in the early phases. The empirical data from the pre-study, together with 
additional data collection regarding a previous research study concerning a concept 
vehicle (Exhibit 8) and the UBI study, formed the basis for Paper I and Paper II.  
Of the three identified areas, the internal flow of technology towards commercialization 
was chosen for the main study as of 1998. The main study was entitled “Internal 
Technology Transfer”, and was supported as well as internally coordinated by a steering 
group consisting of line and project managers from the technology and product 
development function. The main study continued with the semi-structured interviews, 
using approximately an additional 25 interviews, in order to analyze the relation between 
the advanced engineering and product development functions. The interviews were 
combined with a company-internal survey (779 persons, 69% response rate) with the aim 
of nuancing and summoning the working practices thereby related at the five different 
functional areas.  
The findings from both the interviews and the survey were discussed with persons 
ranging from engineers to the top management, as well as summarized in a company-
internal report entitled “Internal Technology Transfer”. The study revealed two modes 
of advanced engineering structures, one favoring technology development (termed 
 
 
 23
“myopic pursuers”), and one favoring technology transfer (termed “integrative 
firefighters”), and resulted in Paper IV. In parallel to the interviews and the survey, a 
case study, from project start to manufacturing, has been conducted of a concept vehicle 
(taking approximately two years and followed by weekly half-day project meetings, 
minutes, reports, separate interviews, attendance at milestone meetings, etc.). 
 
Exhibit 8: Example of a concept vehicle. 
 
During this case study, the opportunity to study an actual replacement of full-size clay 
models with digital ones, i.e. Virtual Reality (VR) models, in the advanced engineering 
setting was taken (Paper III). It was shown that VR models are more beneficial to use 
earlier in the design cycle, when it comes to quickly generating full-size models, than to 
substitute full-size clay models. Further, during one of the project meetings of this study 
followed longitudinally, the need for a method or tool for dynamically working with the 
project scope was perceived, and hence, the development of one was initiated. After a 
literature review and several iterations with the practitioners, the R&D content graph 
was developed (Paper V). Finally, during 2000 the last paper (Paper VII) stemming from 
the VTC study was written upon further analysis of the survey and the interviews, 
focusing on the link between advanced engineering and product development within the 
company. Paper VII highlighted a rough situation for applied research, where tasks often 
are de-staffed and prolonged, and then fail to be used due to not having solutions ready 
in time for product development projects. The VTC study ended during the autumn of 
2000. 
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The Ericsson Mobile Communications study 
The Ericsson Mobile Communication (ECS) study started out at Ericsson Mobile 
Communications in Lund during the summer of 1999, as a result of Ericsson contacts 
initiated during my participation in the CHAMPS program “International Management 
of Technology”. Similar to the other studies, a pre-study was conducted where a total of 
22 persons involved in technology and product development were interviewed in order to 
cut out important research issues. This pre-study was done in collaboration with Martin 
Karlsson, a fellow researcher, and two subsequent studies were put forward to, and 
accepted by, the steering committee. Turning to the literature, the set-up of separate 
more or less autonomous organizations was found to be an appraised phenomenon, 
especially with regard to rapidly developing new technology. However, few researchers 
had analyzed what I termed the re-integration of knowledge and technology back to the 
parent organization. Hence, the study I focused on was the knowledge transfer back to 
the parent organization from a separated skunkworks-like organization, one that had 
been set up for developing the “Bluetooth” technology (Exhibit 9). 
 
Exhibit 9: Example of a Bluetooth product (Sony Ericsson’s wireless headset HBH-20). 
 
The study of the evolution and strategic actions related to the Bluetooth organization 
was conducted during the autumn of 1999 and the spring of 2000. Further, during the 
study, it was found that Intel Corporation had been playing a vital role in the execution 
of an open standard. Consequently, during my stay as a visiting scholar at the Haas 
School of Business at the University of California, Berkeley, I visited and discussed the 
Bluetooth case with key employees at Intel’s headquarters in Santa Clara. The Bluetooth 
case study is based on 19 semi-structured interviews that were taped and analyzed by 
using the NUD*IST software for qualitative data, and through attendance at Bluetooth 
training seminars, organizational announcements, and company internal presentations; 
 
 
 25
secondary press has also been used. The study casts some light on the evolution of a dual 
organizational structure, on potential re-integration efforts and outcomes thereof; it also 
discusses managerial issues associated with the double-edged sword of integration and 
differentiation. The study covered the early stages of the Bluetooth development until 
the announcements of the next step after the release of the first Bluetooth specification 
(early 2000). The outcome of the study was published as an IMIT (Institute for 
Management of Innovation and Technology) report, No. 113, and as a slightly revised 
version of Paper VI. 
B.3. METHODS APPLIED 
In order to study management of R&D processes, a diversity of methods has been 
applied – all depending on specific purpose and context for the respective paper and 
study. The methods used can be divided into three major areas, ranging from broad 
approaches using surveys to in-depth case analysis and to more action-oriented 
development of decision tools. Below follows a description and discussion of the methods 
used. 
Broad approach using surveys 
Within the field of social sciences, the survey method (qualitative or quantative) is one of 
the most common empirical approaches (Roberts, 1999). The use of a broader (internal) 
survey method was applied in the VTC study. The VTC study originated with a more 
qualitative approach using interviews in order to get a basic understanding of the way 
technology development was organized, conducted, planned, and funded in the company. 
However, the VTC organization consisted of five different departments, and I came to 
the conclusion that using interviews was insufficient and ineffective in order to reach this 
level of understanding – every department managed technology development in its own 
manner. Consequently, a company-wide survey targeting R&D-involved personnel at 
VTC was launched in order to describe, analyze, and model management of technology 
development. This survey targeted the whole population, all in all 779 identified persons. 
Further, it encapsulated both technology development and product development 
personnel, to enable a simultaneous and holistic view of the major parts of the R&D 
chain. 
The strengths in using this kind of internal survey are that misunderstandings of terms 
and definitions can be avoided, sticking to one company’s use of language; a holistic view 
of R&D processes is provided to a high level of detail; interviews and case studies might 
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follow to illuminate potentially raised issues; and a comparably high response-rate level 
can be gained. This kind of survey, though, is constrained in terms of generalizing the 
findings and in terms of applicability to other types of industries. However, the purpose 
of the study was not to generalize, but to gather an understanding of variations within 
one single setting, and the potential effects these might have on technology development 
speed and internal transfer of results. In a way, this study can be seen as a case study 
where a developed survey constituted the basic platform of understanding. The survey in 
itself could be categorized as descriptive in nature, i.e. with a clearly defined hypothesis, 
a response rate higher than 50%, and the aim of understanding a phenomenon (Forza, 
2002). 
Further, alternative approaches that were abandoned concerned, for example, using a 
cross-company, cross-industry type of survey mapping, and analyzing technology 
development and product development as well as the interface between them. The 
difficulty in defining the appropriate terms, and Hill et al.’s (1999) argument for closing 
the academic/practitioner gap with empirical closeness and continuous interaction to 
secure viable and industrially useful research results, were the basis for the choice to start 
within one company setting. A wider survey holds other benefits and could well function 
as a complement after this study, investigating for example the presence of internal 
transfer teams and responsibilities, the balancing of technology development vis-à-vis 
product development and basic research, etc. 
In-depth approach using case studies 
In all of the studies, different forms of case studies have been used – ranging from short 
and concise examples in Paper II illustrating internal transfer issues to an in-depth case 
study of the evolution of the “Bluetooth” technology in Paper V. A case study is 
described by Leonard-Barton (1990) as “history of a past or current phenomenon, drawn 
from multiple sources of evidence. It can include data from direct observation and 
systematic interviewing as well as from public and private archives…any fact relevant to 
the stream of events describing the phenomenon is a potential datum in a case study, since 
context is important”. The traditionally noted weakness of the case study method is its 
limited capacity for generalization of findings, i.e. the findings are constrained by being 
situation-specific. However, its weakness is also one of the strengths, enabling learning 
from a particular case conditioned by the environmental context (Gadde and Dubois, 
1999) – putting the results into context and meaning.  
Further, in line with this reasoning, Dyer and Wilkins (1991) highlight one of the aims of 
case study research: to develop exemplars, i.e. stories against which other researchers (or, 
one might add, managers) can compare their experiences and gain theoretical insights. 
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Moreover, the case study method was chosen also for its strengths (see Hill et al., 1999; 
Yin, 1994, p. 3) in approaching the high level of complexity involved in the understanding 
of R&D processes. The case study method has indeed been argued to be one of the most 
powerful research methods within the technology and operations management area 
(Voss et al., 2002). The strengths of the method are its closeness to empirical data and the 
increase of research that has managerial relevance. The use of case-based research is also 
noted as a growing trend within the research community (Hill et al., 1999). 
To summarize, using case studies as a methodological basis is a way of achieving 
empirical closeness, contextual validity and interesting research. The phase of collection 
and analysis, as well as the development of models and constructs, have been conducted 
by me on site. Most of the case studies performed within the UBI, VTC, and ECS 
studies, like the classical case studies referred to by Dyer and Wilkins (1991), have been 
conducted within one organizational context (e.g. Paper IV). There is, though, a natural 
trade-off between deep understanding of one single social setting and the benefits 
associated with insights of a more comparative nature. This dilemma has been 
approached by not only studying the same setting, but moving between three different 
contexts (electromechanical industrial goods, industrial automotive sector, 
telecommunication consumer goods) throughout the Ph.D. process in order to widen my 
own understanding of R&D. 
Action-oriented approach developing new tools and methods 
In the studies, the development of decision-making tools has not been the stated purpose 
of a specific study; rather, development of tools has been catalyzed by a need perceived 
during the execution of the other studies. For example, during the study of a concept 
vehicle project at VTC, a need for alternative ways of structuring and visualizing the 
project scope was perceived. Consequently, in interaction with the project leader and the 
project team, the development efforts began (Paper V). This was also to some extent the 
case for the analysis of different front-end process models in Paper I, and for the 
development of the prototyping evaluation method in Paper III. However, the most 
obvious example of development of a new tool is the R&D content graph developed in 
Paper V.  
Huang (1996) discusses the development of new methods and tools, and argues for the 
following functional requirements to be approached10: gather and present facts, measure 
performance, evaluate level of goodness, compare alternatives, highlight weaknesses and 
strengths, diagnose the reasons behind the level, provide directions for potential 
                                                 
10 Originally developed for suiting Design For X-tools which is not directly equivalent with the targeted 
tools, but gives some guidance 
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improvements, predict what-if effects, carry out improvements, and allow iterations to 
take place. The R&D content graph fulfills most of these criteria by focusing on 
gathering and presenting facts, forming a basis for measuring, evaluating, comparing, and 
diagnosing R&D project content; but it is not intended to provide any level of goodness 
or suggested direction. 
Further, the development of new tools has not involved the testing or verifying phases to 
a large extent outside the specific case environment, but merely focused on development 
of the tool as such. Development of new tools and methods is action-oriented per se, 
though there has not been any demand from the steering groups to deliver new tools 
(except the action research approach: e.g. Lewin, 1946). This has allowed a rather free 
and open-minded participation during, for example, the VTC study. The process for 
developing tools has, as noted before, been initiated due to a perceived need, a need 
which then has been verified by the parties involved. Thereafter, a literature search 
started seeking solutions, perspectives, or dimensions potentially relevant for the specific 
need. 
B.4. QUALITY OF DATA, AND ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The thesis has been demarcated to sharpen the focus; thus, the studies and the results 
principally concern new product development in larger high-tech manufacturing firms 
with internal R&D capabilities. The thesis does not directly deal with more engineering-
oriented types of work related to products already on the market, nor does it incorporate 
work of a more research-intensive nature (e.g. pharmaceuticals). The products of the 
firms that have been studied are also complex, in the sense that they consist of several 
different technologies, often with different life cycles, and that all need to be integrated 
to result in a coherent product. Further, time to market has been of utmost importance 
for the R&D function of the firms. Finally, the focus has primarily been on the R&D 
work conducted at the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), the focal point for 
most trade-offs and managerial dilemmas. The aim of the studies has not been to draw 
far-reaching conclusions based on the sample of cases chosen, but rather to reach an 
understanding of the processes and issues behind the management of R&D processes – 
indicating difficulties that manufacturing firms might encounter and potential 
approaches. The theoretical base consists mainly of peer-reviewed scientific journals, 
aiming to build on validated and accumulated knowledge within the research community. 
Prior to each study, extensive theoretical searches have been performed, trying to 
identify relevant research streams for the issues.  
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Moving on to more methodological issues, the studies presented in this thesis are not to 
be seen as either inductive or deductive, but as a mixture of the two approaches, 
sometimes referred to as an abductive way of working (e.g. Gadde and Dubois, 2001; 
Kirkeby, 1994). The term “abductive” captures well the research approach taken in this 
study, i.e. a close interaction between empirical data and theory. This way of working is 
exemplified by Eisenhardt’s (1989) description of an investigator’s need of moving back 
and forth between case companies, research question redefinitions, and potential 
additional field studies. One clear example of applying this method is evident in Paper V. 
The process then started with the fact that a need for alternative ways of managing 
project content was perceived during a project meeting, leading to project scope 
dimensions derived from theory and then applied and tested in the project, ultimately to 
be reworked and theorized about. The focus on case studies as a methodological basis is 
also due to the standpoint that sometimes the full picture can only be revealed by 
analyzing real life, a situation where some potentially crucial interactive processes (which 
might be transparent to large-scale surveys) can be identified and explored. 
Throughout the thesis work, there have been several different potential routes to choose, 
choices that no doubt have had an impact on the outcome. In some cases, the identified 
opportunities have overshadowed the current research focus and design, resulting in 
bringing that study onboard – widening the overall research focuses. It is my opinion that 
as a researcher one ought to pursue and exploit potentially valuable opportunities, but 
bearing in mind the trade-off between more deductive versus more inductive studies, and 
breadth vis-à-vis depth of the research scope. One of those examples is Paper III, where 
the opportunity arose regarding a potential exchange of full-scale clay models for digital 
ones. Another example concerns methodology: the deliberate choice of not pursuing the 
action research stream. 
Consequently, one alternative basic approach for this thesis would have been action 
research (see Lewin, 1946), meaning that the researchers deliberately take actions within 
an organization and aim to create knowledge gained from those actions. The researcher 
acts as an agent of change, with two missions – one of solving problems assisting the 
practitioner, and one of contributing theoretically (Coughlan and Coughlan, 2002). 
However, the studies have been conducted by me as an independent observer, free to 
suggest actions but not to drive and aim for solving problems. If the action research 
approach had been taken, I would not have been an independent observer, but a 
participant. Being a participant means taking active part in the implementation of a 
system and simultaneously evaluating a specific intervention technique – consequently, 
the process of change becomes the object of study (Benbasat et al., 1987). It is my belief 
that the action research route holds high value and requires a methodologically skilled 
researcher, potentially having intimate relationships with, or a special role in, the cases in 
question. 
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When it comes to quality of the research being conducted, the constructivist approach 
introduced by Guba (1985, p. 290) discusses the term “trustworthiness” for validity. The 
term refers to establishing credibility of the findings and thereby ensuring their quality. 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, p. 90) present several potential activities assisting in 
strengthening the quality of research, and the following activities have been applied in 
this thesis: 
• Prolonged engagement and persistent observation: The first technique refers to 
time spent on site to build trust and to learn the culture. The second technique 
refers to observations to get depth and to understand the relevance of certain 
aspects of the social scene. These techniques have been heavily used throughout 
all three studies. 
• Triangulation techniques: Applying a mixture of methods to view a portion of 
reality from different angles, for example mixing interviews, surveys, and 
observations when studying a certain phenomenon, as in Papers I and VII. The 
chosen interviewees or respondents have also undergone a deliberate selection 
process, to ensure that the purpose of the studies will not be biased by the 
interviewees’ particular organizational background or other elements of their 
profiles. The selection has also been elaborated and discussed in three categories 
with different purposes: recommendation, understanding, and problem-centered 
selection (Arbnor and Bjerke, 1994, p. 240). 
• Member checks and peer debriefing: These techniques refer to asking members of 
the social scene (e.g. from the case companies and colleagues from academia) to 
check the data, analysis, and conclusions. All results and reports have been 
discussed and shared in an iterative manner with interviewees and company 
representatives, as well as via the research community through conference 
presentations, journal publications, personal contacts and informal discussions. 
• Thick descriptions: Increasing the transferability of interpretations and 
conclusions, in practice this technique means securing detailed descriptions of the 
cases studied for others to share. One example of this technique is the detailed 
description of the Bluetooth case in Paper VI. 
Hence, the internal (e.g. member checks) and external validity (e.g. thick descriptions) 
have been approached using several different techniques to ensure high quality of the 
data, analysis, and conclusions. Further, the research has been carried out with a systems 
approach, meaning that the use of terms, definitions, and reality matters foremost within 
the system studied, hence being context-dependent. All data that have been collected 
and interviews that have been performed have been filtered through the “colleagues and 
I” view of the world, our values and perspectives (for a discussion of research values and 
perspectives, see Merriam, 1994). When verifying and ensuring the data collected as well 
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as the perspectives, Arbnor & Bjerke (1994, p. 251) argue that the researcher ought to 
spend as much time as possible within the studied system in order to mirror it in several 
different perspectives (see the above technique of prolonged engagement). Finally, the 
systems approach is in general pragmatic, indicating high validity when the results give 
guidance for the targeted group. The pragmatic approach is also evident in the wide 
variety of methods applied, i.e. choosing and applying methods without constraints and 
depending on the targeted research issue and possible research design. As a former 
colleague states: “pragmatism maintains that different metaphors should be used 
depending upon the phenomenon that is being studied; the research methods should be 
chosen according to the questions that are asked” (Magnusson, 2000, p. 16). This view is 
not constrained to a certain set of qualitative or quantitative methods, but gives more 
freedom of choice depending on context and purpose. The goal is also to generate 
practically useful knowledge and viable innovative theory (cf. Wicks and Freeman, 1998). 
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C. EXTENDED SUMMARY OF THE PAPERS 
In this chapter, each of the seven attached papers is summarized, with a wider purpose 
than just clarifying each paper’s contribution. An extended summary is thus provided in 
order to further elaborate the issues presented in the papers in terms of key dimensions 
used, limitations of the study, positioning, and challenges approached – issues usually 
constrained and limited in the journal publication format. This chapter is also used to 
discuss elements of an integrative nature between the different individual contributions. 
C.1. PAPER I:   EXPLORING THE “FUZZY FRONT END” OF THE 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROCESS 
The early phases of product development11 have been regarded as fuzzy by many 
commentators (e.g. in terms of organization, process and method) and at the same time 
as an area where improvements show great potential for the whole R&D process12 (e.g. 
Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995). In a way, the early phases concretize the interface 
between technology development and product development, linking emergent 
technology to market demands in the form of a development project. 
One example of an asserted need for other ways of working with process models is the 
research of MacCormack, Verganti, and Iansiti (2001) in the software industry. They 
note that traditional stage gate models might be applicable in companies working in 
more stable environments, but that there might be a need for a more flexible way of 
working in industries involving higher uncertainty and greater dynamics. Further, Lager 
(2001, p. 12) brought forward several weaknesses in the overall treatment of process 
models within the product and process development domain, pinpointing differences 
between theories and reality in industry, and highlighting the importance of recognizing 
the development context and the characteristics of the individual projects.  
Viewing the early phases of product development, much of the previous research has 
striven towards developing one single model, ubiquitously applicable – without 
adaptations to, for example, industry context, type of project, competitive situation etc. 
(see Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995; Smith and Reinertsen, 1991; Kumar and Murphy, 
                                                 
11 Often referred to by speaking of the “front end” of product development or by using the term “pre-
development activities”. 
12 It is worth noticing that the classical view of the early phases’ strong influence on project cost, quality, 
and lead time is under debate with regard to rapidly moving industries. In those industries, vital 
information regarding opportunities and constraints is not available during the early phase; instead, a more 
reaction-based approach needs to be taken (cf. Verganti, 1999; Iansiti, 1995). 
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1997). Early attempts were conducted by Cooper (1983) who defined three main pre-
development activities for the early phases13, activities that were later applied through 
surveys to a variety of industries and companies in order to cut out successful patterns 
(Cooper, 1983; Cooper, 1988; Cooper and Kleinschmidt, 1995). Cooper’s work has been 
adopted and followed by, for instance, Kumar and Murphy (1997) who used a similar 
survey-based approach.  
In addition, a scarce attempt at describing and discussing contingencies for different 
front-end models has been made by Reinertsen (1994) and Khurana and Rosenthal 
(1998). Reinertsen identifies two different tracks for the front end: a process model 
common for most projects, and a fast-track front-end model. Khurana and Rosenthal go 
a bit further, initially discussing the potential need of adapting the front-end model to the 
product, market, and organizational context of the firm. However, no discussions are 
found on the potential impact of the type of project, or on how managers are to view and 
work within the early phases of product development. Hence, the aim of our study is to 
explore and contrast different early phases of product development and also their 
applicability to one more general front-end model, all with the aim of assisting managers 
who work with the early phases, as well as testing the applicability of previous research 
models and perspective. 
Following this, several companies as well as researchers have striven towards defining, 
mapping, and describing one single process model applicable for the early phases of the 
R&D projects. This paper indicates that such a single model is far-fetched, arguing for 
viewing and managing the early phases in a more flexible and dynamic manner. The 
study showed differentiated process models with respect to sequences, relative time 
duration, and perceived importance of individual tasks as well as activities performed. 
Consequently, this implies that it might be less useful to pursue and map out one process 
model for the early phases of all R&D projects. There is clearly a need for adapting the 
process models according to, at least, type of project and staffing situation. Further, a 
potential way of working with the concept of “front-end routes” (Exhibit 10) is provided 
– consisting of a bundled set of core activities that might be considered when starting up 
new product development projects. This proposal is not empirically tested, i.e. based 
upon any performance measures; it is merely to be seen as a mental model or way of 
working, based on ideas stemming from the author’s interactions with the pre-project 
leaders. 
                                                 
13 Idea generation, Preliminary assessment, and Concept definition. 
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Project Planning
Concept Screening
Concept Generation
Concept Definition Business Analysis
Project Planning
Front End Route A
Front End Route B
Concept Generation
Business Analysis
Concept Screening
Front End Route C
 
 
Exhibit 10: Schematic framework describing different activities, their potential sequences and relative 
priorities and staffing (indicated by circles), as well as enabling a more flexible perspective of different 
front-end routes. 
 
The intention is that managers should carefully consider the different characteristics and 
needs for the specific project(s) in question, and then, together with the potential team 
members, determine which route elements to go for and in what sequence as well as 
where the higher priorities might lie. This is in line with Verganti (1997) who notes that it 
is necessary to have both reactive and proactive actions by management, and that 
proactive actions focusing on identification of critical areas are to be emphasized in the 
early phases of product development (by building from past project learning). Further, 
by creating this forum to establish a viewpoint early on, more suitable process models (or 
at least views more aligned within the team) might be obtained. Once potential routes 
are established and the work progresses, there seems to be a need for continuous 
managerial flexibility in terms of staffing, priorities, and advanced planning. 
The methodological issues of the study relate to the case-based approach and research 
instrument, the sample and choice of the three cases, and the scope of the research, 
dimensions and terms used. First, the explorative case approach was chosen as a 
consequence of the limited research work that had previously been conducted within the 
area. At the same time as the literature search was being conducted, similar efforts 
towards one process model applicable for all projects were being observed at the 
company in the VTC project. Altogether, the clear direction of research and the indices 
from the study company (a trend later strengthened by the literature study) motivated 
the question of how process models for the early phases in different types of projects 
were composed and managed. The research question would have been improved by also 
incorporating a broader perspective gained by using surveys, though bearing in mind the 
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extreme difficulties in using appropriate definitions of the phases for each and every 
company.  
As regards the choice of research instrument, a wide variety has been used in order to 
capture the essence of the early phases, e.g. surveys, observations, company-internal 
data, and interviews. The elements have been synthesized from previous research, and I 
put open-ended questions to the interviewees, allowing them to elaborate and to freely 
describe the early phases. A related issue, too, is the choice of involving the pre-project 
leaders, at the risk of getting the management’s perspective alone, and of receiving a 
stylized version of the early phases. It is our opinion, though, that the pre-project leaders 
were heavily involved and hence do not represent the top management’s perspective, 
honest in its beliefs, and that they had nothing to gain from delivering a smoother 
version. The study would also have been improved in relation to pre-project members; 
however, as the aim of the study was to function as an initial test of process models for 
the early phases, the result is clear in itself and indicates an area where more work needs 
to be done. Second, the choice of the three cases is a combination of research access and 
relative differences in types of projects being conducted. It was also decided that in-
depth studies of three different cases would be enough for the initial test. Third, the 
scope of the research constrains the study, by discussing only differences in front-end 
process models. Further, the applicability of the findings might be constrained, for 
example by the choice of industry setting and product complexity. 
Two of the main terms that were used are “early phases of product development” and 
“process models”. The early phases of product development can be designated in many 
ways: e.g. fuzzy front end, pre-project phase, and pre-study, meaning the initial stage 
where analyses are conducted regarding the set-up and content of the forthcoming 
product development project. This set-up also usually determines, or makes suggestions 
for, the resource allocation (e.g. staffing, budget, IT resources) to the subsequent project, 
and hence it leads to the working definition used in this study: “the early phases of 
product development represent work aiming at commercialization of a specific product 
and definition of the project set-up, which is being conducted before a formal product 
development project is specified or otherwise stated”. Common elements of the early 
phases are: mission statement, concept generation, concept screening, concept definition, 
business analysis, and project planning. The early phases of product development, 
though, do not involve strategic product planning, technology development, or market 
analysis; the role is more of an integration and screening task with respect to these issues. 
Finally, the term “process model” refers to descriptions valuable for visualizing the work 
performed in the early phases of product development. Hence, in this paper the work 
with the dynamic process model targets the provision of insights for managers involved 
within the early phases of product development to structure, develop, and reflect upon 
the activities put forward. 
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The theoretical contributions in this paper are primarily related to re-focusing research 
towards different front-end contingencies, instead of the current pursuit of a single front-
end process model covering all cases. Furthermore, the study provides illustrative in-
depth descriptions of the early phases from three different projects, and puts forward a 
way of approaching the stated fuzziness that might be useful for both managers in their 
daily work and the research community when taking the next step. 
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C.2. PAPER II:   MANAGERIAL ISSUES IN PARTS SHARING 
AMONG PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
The importance of the commonality issue has increased as a means to control costs, 
increase component and overall quality, and decrease project lead-time. Which parts to 
reuse, and when, are vital issues in, for example, applying a product platform strategy. 
The internal transfer or parts sharing of components or technology might, for instance, 
occur between technology development and product development, between different 
products separated in time, and between different concurrent projects.  
Nobeoka and Cusumano (1994, 1995), McDermott and Scott (1994), and Ulrich (1995) 
have all highlighted the benefits of sharing parts, while Muffatto (1996) and Meyer 
(1997) have gone one step further and also regarded the sharing of parts as difficult, 
though few examples are to be found of what these difficulties might be, and at what 
levels they might exist. When it comes to what kind of challenges previous research 
poses, those are mainly of a technical nature (Hubka and Eder, 1988, p. 342; Pahl and 
Beitz, 1996, p. 354), focusing on the technology as a potential hindrance to parts sharing. 
However, many companies have reported not being able to reach the determined 
commonality targets (e.g. Honda in Muffatto, 1996; Volvo in Sundgren, 1998, p. 35; Ford 
in Ealey et al., 1996; Boeing in Rothwell and Gardinger, 1988), indicating that the issue of 
sharing parts is complex to handle. Hence, this paper takes the management’s 
perspective on the issue of parts sharing, with the aim of helping to overcome potential 
barriers to reaching appointed commonality targets and to widen the academic scope of 
internal transfer research. 
The findings illustrated incidents and potential barriers as well as a way of intentionally 
working with internal transfer of parts in order to create a reuse-friendly foundation and 
to avoid unnecessary suboptimizations. Managerial difficulties were found in the 
companies regardless of size and industry sector, indicating the generic and complex 
nature of internal transfer. Prescribing a certain degree of commonality is one thing; 
reaching it is another. Other studies have mainly focused on the technical side of 
reusability, while this study applied a more systemic view. For example, it was found that 
a common attitude among managers was to consider reusability as the responsibility of 
the engineers. This is most noteworthy, especially since the study revealed that engineers 
often were unable to deal with the difficulties of parts sharing for a number of reasons. 
An example of the first category, i.e. organizational issues, is related to conflicting aims: 
it was unclear in several cases whether this was to be considered as the line organization’s 
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or the individual project’s responsibility. An example of the second category reveals that 
a strategic issue related to internal transfer is the lack of carry-over targets at the 
individual project level, and the fact that the commonality issue often was addressed too 
late in the projects, resulting in low priority and a low degree of commonality.  
Third, the technology and cost system-related issues illustrate that, even if it might be 
technically feasible to transfer and share parts between different products, an obstacle 
may be the cost of parts – for example, the trouble of having a luxury product share parts 
with a budget version, resulting in too little price differentiation. Finally, an example of a 
support systems-related issue pinpoints the need, and difficulties of, evaluating 
downstream consequences. In one case, the engineer was unable to evaluate the trade-off 
between potential ease of assembly as a result of a redesign and the purchase cost, 
resulting in an expensive suboptimization unsuitable for the lower-end products. Overall, 
the study was explorative in nature, illustrating potential managerial difficulties related 
to internal transfer of components – a process which is complex due to the need of 
viewing the process outside the boundary of a single engineer’s or manager’s traditional 
responsibilities, and due to the fact that there exist a lot of interdependencies between 
the potential choices and consequences. 
The methodological issues of the study are related to the presented research sample, the 
researchers’ choice of challenges to present, and the stylized way of presenting the case 
findings as well as the chosen parts dimension. First, the presented research sample may 
seem unclear, but is in line with the explorative research approach, and represents the 
choice of drawing on as large a sample as possible – namely the companies that we had 
been working with for a period of time with the issues. Moreover, a comparative analysis 
within the same sort of research sample would be difficult to conduct, though the aim of 
this study lies rather in the domain of providing enough material and insights to assist in 
developing a broader and more detailed study, besides raising the internal transfer 
attention. Second, the managerial difficulties highlighted represent an aggregated 
interpretation of the challenges that the interviewees and companies expressed. The 
criteria of a stated difficulty were that it was to be stated as a barrier towards effective 
internal transfer by one interviewee at the company in question. Niklas and I had no 
quantitative measures, since the study was explorative in nature and since, if the object in 
question was perceived as a barrier, there was no reason not to take that example into 
account – transfer problems are local as well as individual.  
However, when categorizing and aggregating the different internal transfer difficulties, 
the foundation to build upon was chosen from a combination of Leavitt’s (1965) and 
Thurmond and Kunak’s terminologies (1988). Further, in order to support the findings, 
persons deeply involved with the commonality issues from the respective companies 
were given the chance to respond to the categories as well as to the implications. Finally, 
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the use of the term “sharing of technology or components”, or its abbreviation as “parts 
sharing”, covers a variety of events, e.g. the sharing of parts between different 
simultaneous product development projects, the sharing of parts between technology 
development and product development, and the sharing of parts between different 
projects separated in time. This rather general use of the term “parts sharing” is 
appropriate for this first attempt within the area; however, it is likely to find that the 
different opportunities or events of parts sharing may individually differ. One research 
effort subsequent to this study has been made by Corso, Muffatto, and Verganti (1999), 
who discuss industry-specific factors affecting platform- or component-reusability 
strategies. Additional examples concern the internal transfer from technology 
development to product development, involving not only the complexity related to the 
technology, but also the inherent cultural differences and attitudes. Still, using the 
explorative approach, the study exposes several important management issues to be 
reflected upon when striving towards a desired degree of commonality. 
Consequently, the theoretical contributions are mainly related to problematizing an 
unexplored research area (i.e. outside the usual technical reusability focus) of admitted 
importance for practitioners when optimizing economies of scale. Reuse of existing parts 
or technology was found to be a complex task with many cross-boundaries and 
managerial concerns in a company, some potentially related to the size of the company 
and the product complexity. It was also found clearly to be not only an engineering issue, 
but of great importance for management when directing efforts towards the targeted 
degree of commonality. The challenges related to internal transfer of parts were shown 
to be found at different levels and related to different categories – organizational, 
strategic, technology and cost, and support systems issues. 
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C.3. PAPER III:   EVALUATING VIRTUAL REALITY IN AN 
ADVANCED ENGINEERING SETTING 
The introduction of new technology to improve the working methods of developing new 
products is an area that companies constantly need to address in order to remain 
competitive or improve their current position. During the 1990s and the beginning of the 
21st century, IT has been one of the main enablers for changing ways of working in the 
R&D environment (Adderio, 2001). In particular, Virtual Reality (VR) technology has 
gained much attention and interest from practitioners as well as researchers, as a 
technology potentially speeding up the development process (e.g. by cutting time-
consuming prototype cycles: Szefi, 1997), decreasing the development cost (e.g. by 
minimizing the need for physical models: Trygg, 1994), increasing the end-product 
quality (e.g. by earlier system tests: Anderson, 1999), and opening up for more 
interaction (e.g. around visualization tools: Leonard-Barton, 1991). However, as with all 
new technology it needs to be used in the right setting and with aligned expectations in 
order to maximize the related advantages. 
Previous research has stated the potential benefits related to VR technology (e.g. Clark 
and Fujimoto, 1991, p. 176; Szefi, 1997), mostly related to saving cost and time in new 
product development, though few examples have been given of verified savings or 
improvements (e.g. often provided as an ambition to reach a certain savings percentage: 
Velocci, 1996). Encarnaçao and Felger (1996) conducted an international survey within 
the area of VR research, concluding that companies in different industries like 
Matshushita, BMW AG, NEC were all found to evaluate VR visualization techniques. 
However, despite the investments and the sporadic claimed benefits, there exist few 
studies that in a structured manner not only describe the problem targeted by the VR 
technology, but also reflect and systematically report about the context where the VR 
technology was applied, the potential alternative methods, and what the implications for 
future use are. This is particularly the case in the specific area of automotive design, 
which has long debated and actively sought new methods to replace the traditional 
expensive full-size clay models at the end of the design cycle (Maier, 1994; Encarnaçao 
and Felger, 1996). Further, the issue regarding VR models’ potential replacement of 
physical models is complex, one side claiming that “when the model starts to harden up, 
so does a lot of thinking” (Schrage, 1993), and the other arguing for the benefits of having 
a physical model to view, feel, and continuously discuss (Studt, 1996; Adderio, 2001).  
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The top management’s lack of trust, combined with the ability to review VR models and 
base decisions thereon, has also been seen as a potential drawback to going virtual 
(Anderson, 1999). Following this line of reasoning, Kremer (1998) states that the 
acceptance and working practices need to be systematically tested, and also that the 
possible gains still are fuzzy (Kremer, 1998). To summarize, the industrial press as well as 
researchers have highlighted the benefits related to the VR technology, yet studies are 
scarce that describe the contingencies around the use of VR technology, as are studies 
working with the evaluation process within a company. Hence, this paper developed a 
prototyping evaluation method for a Swedish manufacturing company, a method that 
was applied to a case where VR actually replaced a full-size clay model in a technology 
development project targeted towards the development of a concept vehicle. 
The study revealed that the chosen design phase where the VR technology was applied 
was probably not the phase to choose for that technology; no substitution of full-size clay 
models is there to prefer. Instead, the evaluation considered the earlier design phases as 
more appropriate for the VR visualization tool. The drawbacks of the VR technology 
were found to be the limited ability to evaluate geometrical features (e.g. shape, surfaces, 
proportions) and physical attributes (e.g. fit and finish, color, material), while the 
strengths mostly lie in the capacity for interactive modifications. Consequently, instead of 
applying the VR technology for verification purposes in the late styling-freeze phase 
replacing the full-size clay model, it might be more beneficial to apply VR in the earlier 
design phases – rapidly enabling full-size views and potentially substituting for scale 
models, and later functioning as a complement for the styling-freeze clay model. It was 
also confirmed that the use of VR might have a positive impact on project time and cost. 
Finally, the study raised some outstanding issues, e.g. the management’s level of maturity 
when it comes to confirming the chosen design path, the use of technology development 
as a test bed for new methods potentially to be transferred to product development, the 
potential use of VR technology for other purposes such as packaging, serviceability, 
assembling, etc.  
The methodological issues of the study relate to the choice of study object and VR 
technology, the method used for the study, and the dimensions used for evaluation. First, 
the deliberate choice of conducting a case study within the automotive field followed 
because the automotive sector is well recognized for its tough demands on, and use of, IT 
(e.g. within crashworthiness, product design, and virtual verification of processes) when 
developing new models. The opportunity then arises to follow, in real time, a 
replacement of full-size clay models with VR in the technology development domain. 
Some part of the findings is related to the specific VR technology studied, and might as 
such have limited applicability. Moreover, the study is limited to the automotive sector. 
The rapid evolution of VR technology naturally also places a time stamp on the findings.  
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Second, as regards the method used in the case study, the persons involved were chosen 
from the product design department (i.e. product designers and modelers), sub-project 
leaders from the specific technology development project, and two top managers. Hence, 
almost everyone closely involved in the design review was engaged and responded. 
However, it would potentially have been beneficial to include customers (for customer 
inputs), persons from the marketing department (for marketing feedback), and after-
sales (for service input). In addition to bringing more persons into the study, another 
limitation is that there was no full-size clay model to actually make the comparison with – 
it was taken for granted that the persons involved were so familiar and experienced with 
the traditional working methods of clay models that they were able to make the 
comparison. This was indeed the response when the persons were asked the questions. In 
order to further extend the scope of the study, some data from the survey (e.g. the basis 
for Paper VII) were also brought in, to provide a sense of the setting wherein the study 
was conducted. Third, the prototyping dimensions on an aggregated level were 
synthesized from previous research and operationalized by me. The evaluation is highly 
dependent on having an appropriate set of measures, and to further strengthen the study 
those suggested dimensions from the literature were also validated by the interviewees, 
where they had the opportunity of adding dimensions. 
The theoretical contributions of this study are primarily the development and illustration 
of a method and dimensions for evaluating different types of prototypes, in the light of 
viewing prototypes as a mediating object for knowledge transfer by interaction. 
Secondarily, an elaboration of different uses of VR technology and related contingencies 
was presented. For example, it seems worthwhile to thoroughly consider the choice of 
process stage where the new method, depending on its characteristics, might be of most 
value. The more philosophical issue of people’s perception of hard versus soft models 
was also raised: future research might study the differences in perceptions caused by 
using such models. 
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C.4. PAPER IV:   DEDICATED VERSUS DISPERSED APPLIED 
RESEARCH ORGANIZATION 
The organization of R&D has been a continuous debacle for many companies as well as 
for a long time under scrutiny by the research community, altogether picturing a complex 
and troublesome issue and offering few easy answers. It is clear, though, that having a 
well-functioning organization for R&D is an important dimension when maximizing the 
return on R&D spending and securing long-term competitiveness. This paper applies 
generic organizational theory concerning organizational structures to the domain of 
applied research, and combines this with the two vital dimensions of technology 
development and internal knowledge transfer. The study originated from observations at 
a manufacturing company which had chosen to organize the applied research efforts 
within its five departments in two basic modes: having applied research conducted by 
dedicated personnel, or dispersed among a greater number of personnel. The 
management at the company perceived the two modes of organizing as frustrating and 
confusing, and sought an answer to the question of “what is the best way of organizing 
applied research?” The basic data sources used were a company-wide survey of all the 
R&D persons involved (779 persons, 69% response rate) combined with nearly 50 
additional interviews. 
Previous research has long pinpointed the applied research stage as an area with large 
improvement potential, and as vital for long-term survival (Goldman and McKenzie, 
1965; Iansiti and West, 1997). The task of efficient and effective developing, transferring, 
integrating into products, and finally commercializing new technology is no doubt 
challenging. The way companies choose to organize their R&D efforts has an effect upon 
how well they succeed in those respects. Examples of troublesome areas related to the 
organization of R&D, as highlighted by previous research, are: the Not-Invented-Here 
(NIH) syndrome appearing during work hand-over (Clausing, 1994, p. 336), lack of 
communication between organizational interfaces (Katz and Allen, 1985), and bad 
synchronization between technology and product projects and plans (Eldred and 
McGrath, 1997), as a whole affecting technology development or transfer in several 
different ways. Previous research has also dealt with the question of how to organize 
R&D (Jain and Triandis, 1997), although this has typically been done on a more general 
basis, without following the logic that tasks with inherently different characteristics 
require a matching of management and organizational structure (Burgelman, 1985; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1997).  
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Examples of tasks in R&D with different characteristics are applied research and 
product development, where the former works in an environment of higher technological 
uncertainty and complexity (Eldred and McGrath, 1997; White, 1977). Scott (1992) puts 
forward the argument that these differences are significant in explaining different 
structural characteristics (Scott, 1992, p. 256) – indicating that research concerning 
product development is not automatically transferred to applied research. Previous 
research specifically addressing the applied research area or, in particular, the 
organizational structure’s relation to technology development speed and internal transfer 
area, are scarce. For example, Iansiti and West (1997) argue for addressing the issue by 
setting up, and focusing on, special technology integration teams (Iansiti and West, 
1997). More general discussions about specialization and integration (Lawrence and 
Lorsch, 1967) offer some advice potentially relevant for the applied research domain, for 
example also to be found within areas such as alliances (Gomes-Casseres, 1997, p. 92), 
efficiency and teamwork (Katzenbach and Smith, 1994, p. 119), maximizing the use of 
specialist functions (Smith and Reinertsen, 1991, p. 141), and, perhaps the most 
substantial contributions, within organizational theory (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; 
Scott, 1992, p. 102; Galbraith, 1973, p. 31).  
Within the latter, Scott (1992, p. 253) suggests two ways of dealing with the high 
technological complexity and uncertainty. First, the tasks could be divided and handed 
out to subgroups, a statement favoring a dedicated organizational structure. Second, one 
could engage very experienced personnel capable of handling the complexity, thus 
enabling a dispersed structure. Further, Pelz and Andrews (1966, p. 54) depart from the 
existence of interdependencies between different development tasks when arguing that a 
mixture of assignments is desirable. This outlook favors a dispersed structure. In sum, 
there seem to be different benefits of choosing either a dedicated organizational 
structure or a dispersed one, with researchers arguing for each option, but there are few 
discussions regarding potential implications that the two suggested modes might lead to 
in terms of technology development or internal transfer. The suggestions merely end in 
“the more specialized, the more focused, and potentially the more interface troubles”. 
The questions remain as to what the situation might be in the applied research domain, 
i.e. what relation exists between organizational structure and technology development 
speed and internal transfer, and how the interface towards product development may 
function. Hence, this study aims at applying organizational theory towards the applied 
research domain in the light of technology development speed and internal transfer, 
including the interface towards downstream product development. 
The two modes of organizations analyzed were the dedicated and the dispersed structure. 
The dedicated structure is one where appointed persons work more or less solely with 
applied research. The dispersed structure, on the other hand, strives to involve as many 
persons as is beneficial by spreading the applied research tasks, and thus involves many 
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more part-timers. It was found that the two structures differed in terms of both 
technology development speed and transfer. New terms describing the two ways of 
working were developed, i.e. “integrative firefighters” for the dispersed structure and 
“myopic pursuers” for the dedicated structures characteristics (summarized in Exhibit 
11). The integrative firefighters refer to behavior where technology is not being 
developed very rapidly, but where the integration and implementation issues are well 
prepared and considered. In the extreme case, the persons engaged in the applied 
research tasks are more or less the same team which is later responsible for integrating 
the very same technologies. The drawbacks are related to the risk that those part-timers 
will be drawn into more short-term problems of today (e.g. launching projects, quality 
tasks), thereby not fulfilling their applied research tasks. The myopic pursuers, on the 
other hand, refer to behavior where technology is rapidly being developed due to a 
focused effort, while the integration shows more problems. The myopic pursuers relied 
more heavily on formalized knowledge transfer and reached a high perceived applied 
research readiness but, as said before, they ranked lower in preparedness for product 
development. 
 
 Dedicated Dispersed 
Technology 
development  
Good ability to work up budget 
High applied research readiness 
Weak ability to work up budget 
High preparedness for PD  
Technology 
transfer 
Formalized knowledge transfer Informal interactions with 
many actors 
 
Exhibit 11: Summary of characteristics of the Dispersed (integrative firefighters) versus the Dedicated 
(myopic pursuers) applied research structure. 
 
Further, contrary to what was deduced from theory, the highest perceived strategic fit 
and applied research priority were to be found within the dispersed structure – and not 
within the more focused efforts of the dedicated structure. One possible explanation 
thereof might be that the dispersed structure has a tighter connection with today’s 
product development needs, and hence the strategy and priorities are more easily seen as 
important. 
Important methodological issues of the study are numerous, being related firstly to 
choice of object, secondly to techniques of analysis and interpretation, and thirdly to the 
operationalization of terms and the applied theoretical domain. First, issues related to 
the choice of object refer to the constraints of using one single company setting for the 
study: the generalizability will most likely be limited to the automotive sector within 
Western Europe.  Yet the choice of organizational structure, and the possible 
 
 
 46
implications thereof, will provide inspiration and food for thought to managers 
considering different modes of organizing applied research, thereby leaving the toughest 
job to them when the necessary conversion of ideas into their specific context and trade-
offs is to be made. Theoretically, it is hard to state a certain correlation based on this 
study alone; e.g. what makes it say the results are not a consequence of the selection? For 
example, selecting two different ways of organizing as a unit of analysis, it is not 
surprising to find that they differ. One response to the issue is that the way in which the 
study was conducted had more to do with analyzing R&D practices in the five 
departments, where differences emerged from the empirical analysis and were 
categorized into the two organizing modes. The potential linkage between organizational 
structures was also strengthened during the interviews, and hence it also relies on 
managerial gut feeling which ought not to be underestimated.  
Second, limitations worth noticing related to the techniques of analysis and 
interpretation include the fact that the main measure of technology development speed is 
the organization’s ability to work up a budget. This is naturally not a perfect measure of 
technology development speed; another might have been data related to historical 
developments. However, data regarding applied research development speed are hard to 
measure due to the long lead times, especially when the data brought forward also need 
to be correlated with the current choice of organization mode. In the absence of a perfect 
measure, the ability to work up an applied research budget is, in the light of this specific 
company, not as bad as it might seem without context. The company had for many years, 
on a monthly basis, managed its applied research depending on its ability to work up the 
budget, and hence the managers involved with applied research showed progress via the 
spending budgets. This was most likely a response to the long lead times; if the 
organizations could show on a short time basis that they were spending and working with 
applied research, the management felt satisfied. Further regarding methods of analysis, 
the survey covered the full population but made no statistical omission analysis, merely 
viewing the individuals and their positions and background visually. The sample also 
consisted of quite a large group; hence, it is not surprising that significant differences 
were found, one drawback of using statistical analysis as a means of explaining 
relationships. Moreover, the limited space available within the frame of a paper put some 
restrictions on the presentation of the data; in this case the interviews were not given the 
appropriate amount of space.  
Third and last, issues related to the operationalization of the terms and dimensions used 
and the applied research domain are also of importance when discussing the limitations 
of the study and the findings. The term “knowledge transfer” is a troublesome one, alone 
in the focus of separate articles (e.g. Argote and Ingram, 2000; Boland et al., 2001; 
Szulanski, 2000); e.g. Galbraith (1976, p. 122) categorized and discussed different 
integration mechanisms already in the 1970s. In this paper, the term departs from the 
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practical viewpoint of knowledge transfer activities, similarly to Jung (1980) who 
discusses method of documentation, distribution system, informal linkages, and 
credibility in the eyes of the receiver. Following this line of reasoning, the dimensions 
boil down to transfer activities measured by which sources are used for spreading new 
results, which discussion partners are involved throughout the applied research project, 
and where information is to be found regarding ongoing applied research work. The 
measures are mostly based on information-processing activities; bearing in mind the 
weaknesses of solely viewing information flows and thereby not thoroughly capturing the 
interaction points, indications of interaction possibilities have been added.  
Further, apart from the dimensions used, some questions arise related to the chosen 
static, or structurally oriented, viewpoint of applied research. If applying a more process 
view of applied research, the two organization modes could be seen as part of a natural 
evolution, and a question could be asked regarding the equivalence of applied research 
within the two studied modes (i.e. whether they are working with similar, comparable 
tasks). The more structurally oriented approach originated from early observations that 
two main modes existed at the studied company, and that such an approach seemed 
natural as a start. The next steps, though, would benefit from moving down one level of 
aggregation and analyzing the applied research dynamics. Further, due to the concise 
article format, some references of potential value were intentionally left out, for 
example, the literature on teams (e.g. Katzenbach and Smith, 1994), literature outside 
the product development and innovation domain (e.g. Gomes-Casseres, 1997), and 
references within the domain of knowledge and the firm (e.g. Zander and Kogut, 1995). 
Another, more general, limitation is that the scope is held within the firm, more or less 
excluding interactions with suppliers and potential alliance linkages. 
The study nuanced the picture by presenting benefits and challenges for the two different 
modes, hence being able to point at what the modes might lead to in terms of 
consequences for technology development speed and internal transfer. The management 
could thereby be assisted in the choice of organizational structure, although it should be 
emphasized that a simple answer to what the best organization is does not exist; this 
depends on the current context and capabilities, and on what is actually sought. As 
regards further theoretical contributions, the study puts organizational deliberations 
within the applied research area under scrutiny, an area where typical studies are of a 
more broad-based survey type involving several different industry sectors as well as 
companies (e.g. Gupta and Wilemon, 1996; Cardinal, 2001) and where detailed empirical 
data are scarce. Iansiti and West (1997) state for example that there is less established 
understanding of the complex interaction between management of research and 
management of development processes, while Rebentisch (1997) similarly states that few 
studies address how companies ought to proceed when transferring technology under a 
given set of circumstances. There does exist research within the applied research domain, 
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although analysis of organizational structures not along just one dimension (e.g. work 
satisfaction, rate of return) but combining this with the dimensions of technology 
development and transfer within the same study is scarce. The combination enabled 
insights into how different organizational structures might affect technology 
development and transfer; moreover, by choosing one single setting, an ability to study 
different types of behavior and comparable attitudes was supplied. 
 
 
 49
 
C.5. PAPER V:   EMPOWERING PROJECT SCOPE DECISIONS 
The scope of R&D projects has long been seen as a potential source of competitiveness 
and is also a much-debated issue. For example, the less extensive product development 
scope and, consequently, the more frequent model changes by many Japanese 
automotive manufacturers in the 1980s were claimed to be one explanation for their 
strengthened position on the world market. More recent examples are the benefits of 
modularization and platform approaches, involving strategic standardization and 
commonality related to the project scope (e.g. Nevens et al., 1990; Meyer, 1997). It is 
clear that managing the project scope well is an important foundation for successful 
R&D. 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of choosing an appropriate project 
scope. For example, Karlsson and Åhlström (1999) point out the danger of choosing too 
narrow a scope, resulting in more-of-the-same products, while Smith and Reinertsen 
(1991, p. 64) focus on the risk of being caught at the other extreme: the never-ending 
“megaproject” trap. Achieving a proper project scope seems to be challenging, without 
noting that there also exist several different levels of project scope, e.g. planning the 
scope beforehand for a portfolio of products, and managing the scope within an 
individual and running project. At a portfolio level, there exist some generic tools, mostly 
based on financial metrics and technology positioning intended to support top 
management decisions (e.g. Roussel et al., 1991; De Maio, Verganti, and Corso, 1994). 
De Maio, Verganti, and Corso put forward an example of a risk/relevance matrix to be 
used for evaluation and for decisions related to acceleration/deceleration of R&D 
projects. At the lower level, assisting tools that support middle management in the 
execution and continuous adjustments of the project scope are even scarcer. The content 
methodology tool presented by Gerritsma and Omta (1998), though, is one example, 
aiming at measuring project complexity and assessing the firm’s overall R&D portfolio in 
terms of complexity and performance. However, little assistance is provided when 
managing the scope within different projects during execution. Hence, the aim of this 
study is to develop and evaluate a managerial tool that assists during the ongoing 
execution of R&D projects with regard to discussions about the project scope. 
This paper addresses the management of R&D project scope, and has developed and 
pilot-tested a team-based tool to assist in this respect. During my participation in a 
project meeting targeted towards development of a new concept vehicle within the VTC 
study, a perceived need for a more structured and deliberate way of working with the 
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project scope was evident and, as a response, the development of the “R&D content 
graph” was initiated. The R&D content graph can be used on several different levels, 
either at a portfolio level when viewing and analyzing different types of projects, or at 
the level studied in the paper – of an individual R&D project used for managing different 
sub-developments. The tool is built around a mapping exercise of the respective sub-
project leaders or persons responsible for different modules within the overall project. 
They rank their sub-project along the dimensions of: 
• Knowledge-building capability 
• Implementation possibilities 
• Interdependencies 
• Technology uncertainty 
• Strategic fit (measured by top management) 
The tool (Exhibit 12) structures, visualizes, and provides foundations for project 
managers to communicate and discuss the project scope both internally and externally. 
The dimensions above have been developed from theory as well as in cooperation with 
the studied company, and are examples of project scope- affecting indicators. The study 
revealed some predictive capabilities of the tool, brought structure to the project scope 
discussion, and was also appreciated by the top management who expressed a wish to 
apply the tool to the overall portfolio of the company as well. 
 
Exhibit 12: R&D content graph: total project scope, including project cuts and potential recommendations 
(for a description of the use of R&D content graphs and representations of the symbols, see Paper V). 
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Besides mapping out the project scope, the R&D content graph can also reveal what 
path it might be appropriate to take, or at least to consider, with the different subsystems 
(Exhibit 12). For example, the most valuable content for the specific project to continue 
to work with internally might be the subsystems ranking high on knowledge-building and 
strategic fit, while the ones in the lower left area might be first to consider canceling. The 
strategically highly relevant subsystems that do not add to the internal learning might 
similarly be the ones first to consider outsourcing to a third party. And finally, the 
subsystems which add to the internal learning, but which might not be very strategically 
aligned, might be content-considered for re-directing. Managing and aligning technology 
deliberately within the umbrella of a project, with the assistance of the R&D content 
graph, could prove to be powerful. 
The methodological issues of the study are related to the testing in one project 
environment, the build-up and use of the visualization method, and to the choice of the 
five dimensions. First, the testing in one industry and in one company is enough for an 
initial test and development, but would need to be more fully secured and validated in 
the long run in other industries or companies as well. Second, the challenges of changing 
managers’ behavior and introducing a new tool should not be underestimated. The tool 
brings structure and assistance only if certain data are gathered and if the main project 
manager approves the method and the initial time spent. This kind of devotion is not 
easy to elicit when other problems are piled up, overwhelming this kind of slightly pro-
active solution. Further, the choice of visualization method is just one potential way of 
viewing the five dimensions; there might exist other, more sophisticated and perhaps 
flexible, methods not yet tested. Third, the choice of the five dimensions is synthesized 
from literature and slightly adapted to the automotive industry and to the specific 
project. This represents a limitation in itself; however, the paper also elaborates upon 
other influential dimensions opening up for one’s own reflections and for adaptations of 
the reader.  
Going into more detail, the knowledge-building capability refers in this paper to the 
participants’ own judgment of how much a specific subsystem actually contributes to the 
learning and to the building of new knowledge for the members involved. This measure 
tries to grasp one important purpose of applied research as being the knowledge creator 
and a source for tomorrow’s competitiveness, hence bringing up the question of whether 
the tasks are challenging enough and not too much of an operations nature. Such a 
measure is subjective and relative, i.e. biased by the experiences of the team and by the 
responding persons’ personal profiles and wishes. The implementation possibilities refer 
to the commercialization and integration targets set for the different subsystems, i.e. 
aiming to align subsystems in time and to individually question the potential dates. 
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Further, the interdependency measure refers to connections and relations between 
different subsystems, i.e. aiming to visualize and bring up vital relations which might 
potentially hinder reduction of a certain subsystem that scores low on the other 
dimensions but, on the other hand, is crucial for another highly important subsystem. 
This measure requires certain coordination with the marketing department and is, due to 
the higher uncertainty, hard to predict.  
The technology uncertainty is further captured through the next dimension, i.e. asking 
whether there exist any fallback solutions to the specific subsystem. If not, the 
technology uncertainty or risk taken within the whole project is considered as higher. 
However, the fallback solutions for technology uncertainty represent only one indicator 
and would be an oversimplification of a troublesome issue. The technology uncertainty 
issue implies a lot more, for example the technical and integrational challenge. Finally, 
the issue of strategic fit is measured in this study by the top management of R&D. To 
actually gain a proper measure of the strategic fit, one would probably need to involve 
not only the R&D function, but also for example the sales and marketing, customer, and 
after-sales functions. This tool, though, is not to be considered as using fully secured 
data, but is merely a rapid tool assisting project scope discussions and designating areas 
where analysis potentially needs to be done. Individually operationalizing and measuring 
these five dimensions represents a dissertation in itself; the strengths of this tool are the 
rapid holistic perspective, the structure, and the interaction within the team.  
The theoretical contributions are primarily the development of a new method for 
dynamically managing project scope in running projects and the identification of 
dimensions influencing the project scope of applied research tasks. Further, the study 
brings strength to the tool through the choice of method, i.e. following the project in 
question longitudinally with the microscope of managing project content. 
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C.6. PAPER VI:   AN AMBIDEXTROUS ORGANIZATION IN 
PRACTICE 
One of the major challenges for companies is to act in today’s environment by satisfying 
the demands of current customers and to simultaneously focus on, and work with, longer-
term issues such as securing the technology base for next-generation products and, 
ultimately, the survival of the company. One approach towards working with these two 
time horizons is to apply a decoupling strategy where a separate unit is detached from 
the mainstream organization and assigned the longer-term issues, in order to gain focus, 
speed, and clarity (Katz and Allen, 1985). Within industry, the role model for applying 
this decoupling strategy is the Skunkworks organization at Lockheed Martins, a unit 
composed in the 1940s (Miller, 1995). Several other companies have followed, using the 
basis of the successful working methods at Lockheed Martin (e.g. IBM, Sony, Apple, and 
Nokia), though with varying results (Schrage, 1999; Studt, 1996; Day et al., 2001). In fact, 
applying an organizational decoupling strategy within the area of R&D management is 
under debate, some arguing for the speed and focus benefits (e.g. Gwynne, 1997; 
Johnson and Smith, 1985), others pointing to the potential issue of elitism when creating 
these two organizational cultures (e.g. Schrage, 1999; Frand, 1991; Dougherty, 1992; 
Cordero, 1991). It is clear that successful application of such a strategy is troublesome for 
the overall organization. This study analyzes the telecom company Ericsson’s decoupling 
of a separate unit dealing with the “Bluetooth”14 technology (striving for the creation of 
a de-facto standard) and the subsequent attempts at re-integration with the mainstream 
organization. 
Duncan (1976) originally coined the concept of working with a dual organizational 
structure approach in order to become an “ambidextrous organization”. Tushman and 
O’Reilly (1997, p. 14) continued the work with the ambidextrous organization concept, 
an approach stated to be capable of managing both short-term and long-term issues. 
Further, Tushman and O’Reilly (1997, p. 171), like Burgelman (1985) and Gwynne 
(1997), provide a solution consisting of dual structures, where the mainstream or parent 
organization15 is more evolution-driven and the smaller unit is more revolutionary and 
opportunistic by nature. In other words, “management needs to protect, legitimize, and to 
                                                 
14 “Bluetooth” is the name of a technology effort providing a wireless link between all mobile devices to 
incorporate applications within data and voice access points, cable replacements, and ad hoc networking. 
15 The term Parent organization refers to the mainstream business, i.e. the organization from where the 
new unit originates. 
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keep the entrepreneurial unit physically, culturally, and geographically separated from the 
rest of the organization”. This separation has been highlighted by several researchers 
within the R&D management area as beneficial16 (e.g. Chiesa, 2001, p. 173; Clausing, 
1994, p. 48), for example by decoupling certain specific technology development 
challenges from mainstream product development – two tasks differing in prerequisites, 
technical maturity, time horizon, competence needs, process repeatability, and 
completion point (Iansiti and West, 1997).  
The benefits gained by using this organizational approach have been debated, though, 
mainly due to the trade-off between development speed gained at the smaller unit and 
potential integration problems with the parent organization. The development speed has 
been studied and confirmed by many (e.g. Johnson and Smith, 1985, p. 167; Frand, 1991), 
but the integration dilemma has merely been highlighted (e.g. Schrage, 1999; Tushman 
and O’Reilly, 1999) and consequently few studies with an integration focus exist. The 
foothold within this area of research consists of the contingency theorists Lawrence and 
Lorsch’s (1967, p. 1) and Galbraith’s (1973, p. 30) more general work within the 
integration domain. Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, p. 13) studied six organizations and 
came to the conclusion that the more a company differentiates, the more it would need 
to put efforts into integration in order to be successful. They stated further that the 
differences in performance among the studied organizations lay in how effectively these 
integrated. Galbraith (1973, p. 127) followed this line of reasoning by developing rational 
mechanisms for integration, for example discussing direct contact, liaison roles (e.g. an 
integrator), task forces, and teams. Moreover, in the chosen context of having a separate 
unit and a parent organization, the advice present is in the form of Tushman and 
O’Reilly’s more general assistance on how to integrate the two opposites: articulate a 
clear, emotionally engaging and consistent vision, build a senior team with diverse 
competencies, and develop healthy team processes. However, few studies have followed 
the evolution towards an ambidextrous organization and the related underlying logic or, 
perhaps even more complex, the potential debacle of integration with the mainstream 
organization. Hence, the aim of this study is to study an ambidextrous organization 
approach with focus on the dilemma of integration – termed re-integration in the study – 
with the parent organization. 
The study analyzes strategic actions related to the development of a de-facto standard 
approach, presents insights into the evolution of a dual structure as well as the 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that there has been some successful examples where a decoupling strategy for 
technology development and product development has not been applied in full. One concrete example 
thereof is Toshiba Corporation, where Magnusson (1999) describes the efforts at Toshiba where, in this 
case, the technology development and product development is though decoupled geographically, but 
where the responsibilities for product development and technology development resides in one position 
(the ‘Technology Executive’). 
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subsequent re-integration efforts, and offers a new type of ‘Mindset’ integration 
mechanism. It was found that Ericsson Mobile Communication deliberately chose to go 
for a de-facto standard approach (e.g. by hiring an experienced manager in the creation 
of de-facto standards), decided that speed and focus were essential – thereby setting up a 
new entrepreneurial unit – and was early to initiate knowledge re-integration efforts 
tying the two structures together. Starting with the evolution of the dual structure: 
Ericsson recruited new and unbundled staff to get a fresh start, was recognized and 
supported primarily by one champion in the top management, separated out the new unit 
(budget-wise, structurally, and geographically), and encouraged the new unit to seek 
valuable opportunities outside the traditional line of business.  
However, contrary to suggestions by previous researchers, the new unit did not go for a 
cross-cultural approach in terms of attitudes and values. The most obvious tension 
between the parent organization and the new Bluetooth unit followed the prioritization 
work with the two main customer categories, i.e. the parent organization’s mobile phone 
business and the computer industry (read laptops). Further, with regard to the relation 
between the two entities, the benefits for the Bluetooth unit were chiefly related to the 
possibility to borrow experienced engineers and other resources from the parent 
organization and the legitimacy of using the Ericsson brand and recognition. The 
drawbacks, on the other hand, were related to being within the Ericsson umbrella, 
constrained at the time by a general temporary recruitment prohibition, and with the 
above-mentioned conflict between developing mobile phone solutions and developing 
other high potentials. Further, the high speed of technology development was attributed 
not only to the focus gained from having a separate unit, but also to having a strong yet 
constrained vision, to staff the technology unit with a mixture of new and product-
focused personnel, and to base the creation of a de-facto standard upon market shares – 
obtained through commitment via the Special Interest Group (SIG).  
Further, regarding re-integration mechanisms, Ericsson used a variety of approaches. 
First, it initially allowed some lending of experienced engineers from the mobile phone 
parent organization, although the main approach was, as mentioned above, the transfer 
of product-oriented personnel from the parent organization, bringing in all the 
knowledge about what it takes in terms of documentation, market material, accessories, 
technology, and support to exist on the market. Second, Ericsson set up several 
procedural methods, such as the Bluetooth Technology Council and the Bluetooth 
Technology Review committee top function as coordinators. Third, some organizational 
structures were put in place, although at the level of individual projects versus the 
Bluetooth organization (i.e. apart from the SIG establishment for inter-firm integration), 
such as the System Integration Group and the Functionality Team. Finally, a fourth 
integration approach was found, i.e. a mindset mechanism, describing the use of different 
concepts and metaphors in order to direct focus and behavior in a favorable way. 
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Examples of mindset mechanisms used are “engineers without borders” and “technology 
products”.  
Summarizing, Ericsson succeeded in establishing a cross-industry commitment around 
the Bluetooth standard, managed to evolve into a dual structure, was the first to launch a 
Bluetooth product – reaching the technology development goal originally set – and 
worked deliberately with the integration between the new unit and the parent 
organization. The questions raised at this point are related to the next step and the 
forthcoming strategy of the new unit. Four main scenarios were put forward, all based 
upon the two dimensions of knowledge integration and organizational separation – 
dimensions of importance when considering potential new business creation (Exhibit 13). 
Exhibit 13: Potential entrepreneurial unit scenarios. 
 
First, the new unit might prove unsuccessful and lead to a dead end, resulting in 
dissolving the unit. Second, a decision is taken to move the unit along in its current 
direction and continue to re-integrate and exchange new knowledge with the parent 
organization, a scenario titled ‘Re-integration’. Third, the new unit finds its way outside 
the decided business frames of the parent organization, or for other reasons is spun off as 
a separate unit or new company. Fourth, the new unit is moved back and integrated with 
the parent organization, either becoming the new core and mainstream business in the 
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parent organization or just incorporated17. These scenarios, though in typical 
management style, were found helpful and provided food for thought when discussing 
the dual structure strategy at steering group meetings at Ericsson. 
The methodological issues of the study are mainly related to the output metrics, the 
choice and potential bias of interviewees, the possibilities of generalizing the findings, 
and finally the appropriateness of the dimensions used. The lack of output metrics means 
that it is hard to state the effectiveness of choosing a dual structure18 instead of some 
other choice, or actually to state the effectiveness of the applied integration mechanisms. 
However, as a study ending before any mobile phones were released on the market, and 
with the idea of rapidly capturing the uniqueness of the applied approach and growing 
interest of de-facto standard creation, it was my choice to proceed with this limitation in 
mind. As regards the interviewees, they were chosen deliberately and in collaboration 
with the practitioners in order to constitute a representative mix of hands-on engineers, 
high-level strategists, personnel from the parent organization and the new unit, people 
from different functional backgrounds, and persons involved during different stages. 
However, it is likely that the study mainly embodies the view of Ericsson, though 
attempts at checking the statements and data were made by bringing in the lead partner 
during the Bluetooth effort, i.e. the Intel Corporation. To ensure the quality of the data, 
all data were taped, transcribed, and analyzed using the Nud*ist software. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis of the data in, for example, the case of 
identifying an implementation and a visionary management layer is hard to perform, and 
should merely be seen as the position of the interviewees and an indication of a state that 
most likely would have needed a different tool to capture properly. Further, the 
possibilities of generating more general findings are related to the choice of conducting 
case-based research; hence, the aim of the study is not to present such findings, but 
instead to nuance the picture of dual structure evolution, and especially to elaborate the 
re-integration dilemma. Finally, other methodological issues relate to the used 
dimensions. For example, it is hard to tell whether there have previously existed dual 
structures at Ericsson; and if so, the historical pros of such an approach influenced the 
choice of the Ericsson Mobile Communications top management to pursue such a road. 
When viewing the organization at the end of the study, several other new units were 
                                                 
17 In hindsight, Ericsson chose to spin off the Bluetooth unit, though not using any stock exchange 
marketplace. Further, the company has set up a separate unit with the target of selling licenses, and has 
also applied the decoupling strategy further for other technology development efforts. 
18 There are for example questions raised regarding whether a decoupling strategy within the R&D 
Management is appropriate in all cases. Magnusson (1999) puts forward the Toshiba case as an example 
where technology development and product development had not been separated; instead the two 
different tasks were conducted within the same organization – and they were coordinated and managed by 
a new type of role within Toshiba, termed “Technology Executives”, responsible for the integration of 
different technology-related tasks with various time horizons. 
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created in a similar fashion as the Bluetooth unit; thus, the question could be raised 
whether it is then to be termed a dual structure. Further, when viewing the terms 
“strategic actions” and “re-integration”, they were explained in the study as “the actions 
and decisions attributed to realizing the company-wide strategic intent” and “attempts at 
transferring technology back to the parent organization to be incorporated in the products, 
either pro-actively or in response to direct technology implementation needs” respectively. 
Elaborating these a bit further, strategic actions would represent the widely 
acknowledged decisions and efforts that enable a certain targeted direction. The term 
“re-integration” would then refer to an outspoken intent by the company to leverage 
learning and technology gained from the new unit back to the parent organization. In a 
sense, use of the term “re-integration” indicates the dynamics of the interplay between 
the new unit and the parent organization.  
Finally, the four scenarios developed around the two dimensions can always be 
questioned, representing a rough simplification of a complex process of strategy and 
execution. The first dimension of “organizational separation” refers to the degree of 
separation between the new unit and the parent organization, answering the questions of 
how tied the new unit is to the parent organization with regard to, for example, location, 
budgets, business culture, and legal factors. The second dimension refers to “knowledge 
integration”, a term focusing on the symbiosis and the need for re-integration of 
knowledge between the new unit and the parent organization. The term “knowledge” is 
a matter of debate in this setting; I refer to information and interaction related to the 
core technology as well as surrounding parts and packages in order to enable a 
forthcoming commercialization. Moving towards the four scenarios, it is likely that there 
exist several other potential outcomes or sub-scenarios, though the main target for using 
a simplified visualization tool is that it brings up and focuses on vital questions. Further, 
the practical test is whether it may prove useful as a tool in a managerial setting – a test 
that this tool holds indications of passing. 
The investigation presents a detailed case study of the evolution of an ambidextrous 
organization at Ericsson, points to vital insights for other companies to learn from when 
pursuing a similar path, and discusses the integration–differentiation dimensions in a 
more dynamic manner than previous research. The study moves away from a more 
traditional, static view of differentiation and integration where it is primarily the 
environment that is claimed to balance a more dynamic view. The revised perspective 
takes the time factor into account, allowing for rapidly shifting views – from a 
differentiating and seeking unit to a more integrative focused unit and vice versa once, 
for example, a certain milestone has been passed. Consequently, the contingent need and 
setting for the new unit and the parent organization are also considered. Earlier research 
has either appraised or abandoned the dual-structure approach, based on reports of 
successful or unsuccessful cases. This study goes one step further, focusing on an area 
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where the two previous perspectives could meet and find explanatory factors for either 
kind of results: the re-integration between the new unit and the parent organization. 
Further, the proposed integrative concepts of Tushman and O’Reilly (1998) have been 
applied to the case and also developed further. For example, the suggestion of “healthy 
team processes” has been identified in the study as representing a visionary higher 
management level combined with an implementation-focused middle management layer.  
Moving more into details, several researchers (e.g. Jain and Triandis, 1997, p. 61; 
Tushman and O’Reilly, 1999) claim that having a strong vision is useful when 
establishing new units or when developing new technology. This is most likely true; 
however, what was also found in the study was the importance of also effectively 
constraining the vision (e.g. by cost, scope, etc). This is in order not to have the unit 
running for too far-fetched a goal, but rather to get the vision down to earth and to take 
the first step in exploring the road ahead. Further, the widely accepted best practice of 
having researchers stay with the technology from “cradle to grave” (e.g. Harryson, 1998, 
p. 191), is questioned. A more nuanced picture evolves where the concept of integrity 
and the problem-solving skills might be preserved while the commercialization focus is 
enhanced by using a combination of technology champions and a mixture of fresh and 
product-focused personnel. As regards other bridging mechanisms, a fourth integration 
mechanism, apart from the three originally proposed by Roberts and Frohman (1978) – a 
“mindset mechanism” – has been noticed. It should further be noticed that, despite 
previous researchers’ suggestions, Ericsson did not go for a cross-cultural approach when 
setting up the new unit. It could be elaborated whether separating out the new unit 
geographically, budget- and people-wise would be enough to get the sought benefits 
without also taking on the potential cultural challenge. Most likely, this is a complex 
issue where the answer is not either/or, but depends on the situation and the vision, all in 
line with an open systems perspective. 
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C.7. PAPER VII:   LINKING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TO 
PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT 
Manufacturing companies are to an increasing extent dependent upon the ability to 
develop, transfer, and integrate new technology into the product portfolio in a strategic 
and operationally effective manner. Further, managing new technology is often a task of 
managing interfaces, e.g. organizational, technical, cultural, and procedural. Previous 
research has focused greatly on the R&D and production or marketing interface, viewing 
R&D as one unit of analysis. However, many researchers have pointed to the R&D level 
of analysis as being too wide, incorporating different task characteristics as well as time 
targets and cultures. Both practitioners and researchers has also highlighted the 
transition from technology to product as complex and vital, showing great potential for 
improvements with regard to product quality, R&D project cost and timing, as well as 
overall R&D performance. 
Previous research has highlighted the importance of the link between technology 
development and product development (e.g. Chiesa, 2001, p. 15; Eldred and McGrath, 
1997; Iansiti and West, 1997). Cusumano and Nobeoka (1998, p. 150), for example, make 
a strong case for the importance of managing what they term “concurrent technology 
transfer”19, an approach where internal transfer of new technology is vital for success. 
However, few words of advice or illustrations are offered regarding management of 
internal transfer. Clausing (1994, p. 338) emphasizes the inherent difference between 
technology development and product development regarding technology uncertainty and 
complexity, and claims that these differences need to be dealt with in the transfer 
process. Galbraith (1973, p. 114), Rebentisch (1997), and Aoshima (1994) discuss 
categorization of different technology transfer mechanisms on a general level, where 
Aoshima’s categorization functions as an example thereof: technology knowledge 
transfer, transfer process, and codifiability of technology. Further, Leonard-Barton 
(1995, p. 217) argues on a perspective basis in regard to viewing technology transfer as a 
continuous process rather than a single event in time (e.g. Jervis, 1975; Scholtz, 1996). It 
is often possible, though, to identify one moment in time where at least the responsibility 
is being transferred downstream, a feature termed by Eldred and McGrath (1997) the 
Technology Feasibility Point (TFP).  
                                                 
19 Concurrent technology transfer is an example of a multi-project strategy where multiple designs are 
developed simultaneously. In the study, companies using a concurrent technology transfer strategy reached 
a significantly higher positive market share change than the others. 
 
 
 61
There has been extensive work within the overall technology transfer issue, where for 
example Roberts and Frohman (1978) put forward three bridges used for overcoming 
internal barriers, namely procedural, human, and organizational. Following this line of 
thinking, Clausing (1994, p. 335) argues that “successful technology transfer is to transfer 
people”. Similarly on the industrial side, Gomory (1989) focused on the joint 
development efforts at IBM and Harryson (1998, p. 191) describes integrational attempts 
(e.g. strategic rotation of engineers) being made at several different Japanese companies. 
The conclusion from both the academic and the industrial sides seems unanimously to 
identify the human transfer bridge as the most effective, and also to confirm that there 
are differences between researchers and product developers.  
Overall, several different approaches seem to be favorable, though few discussions are 
found regarding during what circumstances certain methods might be applicable or how 
effective they might be. Further, it seems that several of the company examples and the 
studies have not applied a holistic perspective, as they view, for example, either the 
technology development function or the product development function alone. It is my 
belief that it is beneficial when studying an interface to view both perspectives at the 
same time, and also for a longer period of time in order to grasp the complexity and the 
potential perceptive differences between the groups. The aim of this study is to examine 
the linkage between technology development and product development by using a 
holistic perspective on technology transfer. The transfer from technology development to 
product development is studied longitudinally with the three dimensions of 
synchronization, transfer scope, and transfer management. Further, this study explores 
whether there are any differences between technology developers and product 
developers, and consequently also the potential consequences thereof for efficient and 
effective R&D. 
The study confirmed that there are differences between people working mainly with 
applied research as opposed to product development – in line with previous research, 
though this study approaches the potential consequences thereof. It was clear that, in the 
studied case, differences were found both on a background and on a perception basis. 
People working within the applied research field had more cross-functional experiences, 
perceived their work as more advanced and prepared for the subsequent phases, and 
were more result-oriented as opposed to implementation-oriented, than the product 
developers. These differences need to be addressed and considered when improving the 
initial stages of new technology commercialization, for example by clarifying 
responsibilities and by establishing appropriate procedures and components of before, 
during, and after the transfer point. More hands-on actions might be approaches to 
increase the readiness and preparedness of the applied research work in the eyes of the 
product developers by increasing the number of information channels used for spreading 
the results, and to focus more on the development of alternative concepts. This 
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constitutes a mixture of different mechanisms in order to achieve a successful flow of 
technology. 
Further, previous research has pointed to the internal human transfer between upstream 
and downstream phases as vital; however, this study nuances the picture by also 
introducing the use of suppliers as a means of human knowledge transfer between 
applied research and product development. Finally, the study revealed that applied 
research seems to face a situation where the staff often is decreased and the time targets 
are prolonged, at the same time as the main instigator of using developed new 
technology is the mismatch in timing. This is probably one of the worse wastes, i.e. when 
results are being developed but not used due to lack of synchronization. The causes 
might be found on several levels, not only within project management, but also within 
the overall strategic planning. Consequently, by applying a more holistic and continuous 
perspective on internal technology transfer between applied research and product 
development, it is likely that higher R&D precision can be attained. 
The methodological issues of the study are mainly related to the trade-off between depth 
and width, the developed research instrument, and the “microscope” used in terms of 
dimensions. First, the chosen trade-off between depth and width was considered as vital 
for this type of study, making a holistic perspective combined with deep contextual 
understanding hard to apply on a broader basis. However, this study highlights issues of 
relevance for another likely step, a study potentially focusing on effectiveness and use of 
certain integration mechanisms in the company field of choice. Second, the research 
method was combinatory-based and entailed, among other things, a survey of the R&D 
personnel involved. The development of the survey was done in cooperation with the 
company personnel, which is a strength at the same time as it might prove a weakness – 
i.e. the development might have been biased by the persons involved. However, I made 
sure of engaging both people from the applied research area and people from the 
product development area in order to minimize those potential affects. Third and finally, 
the dimensions used could prove to be another source of bias, i.e. the systematization 
from previous literature, illuminating certain kinds of behavior and disguising others. 
However, it is hard to argue for another approach than to build on earlier research when 
investigating previously identified phenomena. 
The study revealed a multi-facetted context, where barriers and enablers could be found 
within the three identified dimensions as well as within the characteristics and attitudes 
among the technology developers and the product developers. Leonard-Barton’s view of 
technology transfer as a continuous process was strengthened, a process that needs to be 
managed deliberately and continuously. One implication thereof is support for the 
indicated vital pre-commercialization knowledge among the product developers, 
potentially affecting ongoing and planned technology development activities in order to 
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achieve efficient transfer. Ensuring efficient internal transfer may help to lower the risk 
of late integration of new technology, potentially leading to gains in development 
flexibility (cf. Verganti, 1999). However, while viewing, identifying, and improving the 
transfer event in itself might be desirable, this is not enough to attain an efficient 
interface and continuous transfer of new technology downstream. The study also went 
one step further down from Eldred and McGrath’s (1997) notion of the TFP point, and 
illustrates a case suggesting how to actually improve the quality of the solution at this 
moment by pro-active actions and by applying a more holistic perspective. The specific 
findings as such might be company-specific, but the challenges and the chosen 
approaches together with their relations may prove a foundation for identifying and 
further understanding the link between technology development and product 
development. 
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D. IMPLICATIONS FOR MANAGING R&D PROCESSES 
This chapter begins by synthesizing the conclusions of Papers I–VII, followed by a more 
normative chapter elaborating potential managerial approaches, and finalized by a 
discussion regarding potential future research issues. 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore, and increase the understanding of, management 
of R&D processes with special attention to technology development, product 
development, and their interplay. This aim is approached by studying two main 
categories or research issues, namely managing internal organizational interfaces and 
technology development and product development scope. The seven attached papers 
each deal with specific topics which have crystallized by getting input from industrial 
partners as well as from academia, topics that have been narrowed down in order to 
enable theoretical contributions. Consequently, this thesis consists of seven papers each 
with individual aims, research problems, and empirical data. Notwithstanding, these 
seven papers do all represent different aspects of the more general research area of 
management of R&D processes, contributing to this larger domain as well. 
D.1. MANAGING INTERNAL ORGANIZATIONAL INTERFACES 
It was indicated in previous research that a key issue when successfully transforming new 
technology into commercially viable products is to overcome organizational interfaces. 
Specifically, the interface between technology development and product development 
was seen as a culprit for effective R&D utilization and as having a large potential for 
improvement. In order to study this interplay, technology development and product 
development as well as the interface need to be approached. 
Early phases of product development 
Paper I approached the research issue formulated as “what activities are performed at 
the early phases of product development, how are they interrelated, and how can 
companies work with these phases to improve overall timeliness and speed?” When 
starting up a new product development project, the early phases of product development 
have frequently been referred to as the fuzzy front end – indicating an unclear way of 
working in those phases. Hence, in order to approach this interface to technology 
development, models of the early phases of product development and their applicability 
to different types of R&D projects were reviewed, in order to improve the project 
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transparency, lower the sensitivity, increase positive repeatability, and consequently 
increase the efficiency in the early phases of product development. 
The study in question analyzed process models or ways of working within the early 
phases, issues that can be approached in different ways. For example, working with the 
design process of the early phases by using the predominant management logic would 
possibly result in trying to force the – most likely already developed – process model for 
the main product development project to fit these earlier phases too. What the 
practitioners potentially strive for is using the process model in order to gain a 
foundation to offer some transparency, and also to get a basis for planning of resources 
and for decision support in the early phases of product development. Working with 
process models potentially also reduces the cost of changing staff within the project; i.e. 
the forthcoming steps are already mapped out and planned in a recognizable way for the 
substituting project staff members. However, the challenge for management is not to 
compel the management of the product development project to function also for the 
earlier phases, but – due to the higher uncertainty and claimed fuzziness – to actually 
develop a dynamic method matching different types of front end projects. This is not a 
trivial task, and the proposed front-end routes may be of some guidance along the road.  
The study also focused on the more generic issue of securing and accumulating 
knowledge gained from previous projects or tasks. The basic assumption is that there is 
an efficiency potential in learning from previous projects, and thus the management 
needs to address both the issue of how to leverage these previous experiences and, in its 
own project, how to accumulate and secure the learning for subsequent projects. 
Bartezzaghi, Corso, and Verganti (1997) argue for the long-term importance to 
competitiveness of exploiting synergy and learning among R&D projects. Hence, there is 
strength in terms of efficiency when encapsulating learning from repeated projects; 
however, there is also a risk of falling into the trap of being too tied to historical methods 
– i.e. being caught in the dominant management logic (cf. Edlund and Magnusson) and 
thereby hindering new, potentially better, ways of working. 
Responding to the research issue, Paper I gives some answers illustrating activities 
(mission statement, concept generation or screening definition, business analysis, and 
project planning) of the early phases of product development. But to fully describe what 
activities are being performed, one would need a broader approach involving other 
industries and companies as well. Paper I describes the relatedness between the activities 
as regards sequence, priorities, weighted importance, staffing, and time allocation. It is 
important to bear in mind the variation depending on project type that was inferred, 
indicating a need for flexibility in those phases reducing the value of using one process 
model for the early phases. This finding also calls for re-focusing academic efforts 
towards different front-end contingencies, instead of the current pursuit of one single 
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front-end process model covering all cases. Finally, the issue of how companies can work 
in the early phases was approached by developing a schematic framework consisting of 
working with different front-end route concepts. It was concluded that flexibility in terms 
of staffing, priorities, and advanced planning was needed, and that managers ought to 
consider the type of project in question when choosing a certain front-end route. Further, 
establishing a cross-functional forum early to handle potential front-end route decisions 
is suggested. Paper I also illustrates and provides in-depth descriptions of early phases 
from three different projects. 
Organizational forms of R&D 
Moving upstream from the early phases of product development, Paper III and Paper VI 
approached the research issue regarding “what effects different organizational forms of 
R&D could have on the speed of technology development and on the internal transfer of 
new technology”. Paper III targets the research issue by reviewing and analyzing two 
different organizational forms of applied research. Paper VI builds on the ideas gained in 
Paper III, and starts from another standpoint, viewing a dedicated and organizationally 
separated R&D unit in terms of technology development speed and internal transfer. 
Starting with Paper III, the management issues analyzed in this paper relate to the choice 
of organizational R&D structure and the implications for the processes of technology 
development and internal transfer. One challenge for R&D managers is to choose and 
work with an organizational structure that matches the needs and requirements of R&D; 
i.e. if the technology development speed is the overshadowing task, it is more plausible 
for them to choose a structure with a more dedicated organizational flavor. On the other 
hand, if competitiveness is based on a smooth transition from technology development to 
product development, a more dispersed structure is probably favorable. After, or facing, 
a choice of organizational structure, the study indicated certain related managerial 
challenges or potential weaknesses. It is of great importance for improving the R&D 
efficiency to be aware of, and to deliberately work within the structure to overcome, 
those weaknesses. If the problems are stated and transparent, they are easier to 
approach. These potential problems were found, for example, within the staffing, 
funding, and monitoring practices of the two structures analyzed. For instance, it was 
concluded that the two structures were largely each other’s opposites, the dedicated 
structure favoring rapid technology development and the other favoring internal transfer. 
These two different organizations were conceptualized, and the dedicated structure was 
dubbed “myopic pursuers” while the dispersed were dubbed “integrative firefighters”, 
highlighting the challenges and the inherent strengths in each form. The contextual 
description and the specific transfer methods being applied within the studied company 
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also constitute a contribution as such, framing and illustrating the conclusions and 
findings. 
Moving on to Paper VI, the implications and managerial challenges related to setting up 
a separate new organizational unit for rapid technology development were studied. 
Previous research has often stated the benefits of such an approach; however, the focus 
of Paper VI is not only on speedy development, but also on the important linkage back 
to the parent organization. The challenges facing managers in this study seem to be to 
create highly differentiated, yet highly integrated, organizations over time depending on 
current and future needs, to be able to secure access to necessary knowledge by rapidly 
and effectively developing new technology. These issues can be divided into three stages: 
establishing a differentiated structure, reaping the benefits of having a separated unit, 
and integrating the knowledge back into the parent organization. Evolving into a dual 
organization structure, establishing differentiating factors as well as reaping the benefits 
of a separated new unit, presents a tough managerial challenge for firms - in particular, to 
actually leverage existing business operations without hampering or otherwise negatively 
affecting the new unit’s business potential. Using the full power of an ambidextrous 
organization enforces rapid entrances into new strategic and viable business areas. Issues 
relevant for management of R&D processes are, for example, staffing and resourcing 
decisions regarding the new unit, setting up or accessing a necessary business network, 
and establishment of integrating mechanisms, monitoring system, and coordination 
responsibilities between the two structures. These initiatives aim at improving the 
interaction between, in this case, mainly the entrepreneurial unit’s technology 
development and the larger unit’s product development efforts. 
It was shown that the traditional view of using separated, dedicated organizations holds 
great value in terms of focus, but also involves several integration challenges with respect 
to the parent organization. A new term for this special kind of situation was used: re-
integration. The term refers to the efforts primarily by the new unit to re-integrate new 
technological knowledge back in the parent organization to be utilized in projects and 
forthcoming products. Further, a dynamic view of integration and differentiation, also 
taking the time factor into account, was revealed. Previous views were chiefly based on 
environmental factors resulting in a certain level of integration and differentiation. The 
evolution and set-up of the new unit revealed several stages where the majority of the 
tasks were directed either to more integration or to more differentiation; hence, a 
constant strain between these two forces was found. Finally, Paper VI nuances the notion 
of having a strong vision by emphasizing the benefits of constraining such a vision, 
questions the stylized fact of the benefits having researchers stay with the technology 
from “cradle to grave”, introduces a fourth integration bridge termed a “mindset 
mechanism”, and opposes previous research suggestions of single-mindedly going for a 
counter-cultural approach when setting up the new unit. 
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Responding to the research issue concerning organizational forms of R&D, it is 
concluded that the organizational form seems to have an impact on technology 
development speed and internal transfer of new technology. Having a more dedicated 
organizational structure favors technology development speed, while having integration 
troubles with internal transfer of new technology; the opposite holds for a dispersed 
organizational structure. For example, in the form where a dedicated unit is separated off 
with the purpose of developing a certain technology, it was clear that speed and focus 
were gained, but also that re-integration issues arose. These conclusions ought to be 
tested on a broader basis, potentially introducing other organizational forms or nuances 
as well. 
Interplay between technology development and product development 
Paper VII (and to some extent Paper III) reviewed the research issue of “how the 
interplay between technology development and product development can be managed, 
and potentially improved”. This issue summons the discussions regarding management of 
internal interfaces. The aspects involved concern the synchronization of technology 
development tasks with product development, management of transfer scope of 
technology development, and handling the internal transfer – all to ensure that the 
appropriate technology is in place when needed. 
The synchronization of technology development tasks with product development is to be 
viewed not only as a match between the technology strategy and the product launch 
strategy, but also on a more operational level. Considering the long-term cycle and aim 
of technology development, the continuous review and discussion about resource 
planning and management of the tasks are vital. Hence, enabling rapid re-focuses or 
accelerations is needed (e.g. when called for due to competitor launches, changing 
market demands, etc.). A second challenge in the study relates to the transfer scope, i.e. 
increasing the R&D efficiency by rapidly reaching a proper, manageable scope. For 
example, a project-scope gap was evident in the study, showing vital differences in what 
the product developers sought and needed as compared to what was actually delivered, 
differences that carry consequences for the performance of R&D (e.g. in terms of 
perceived readiness for the next phase, result-oriented versus implementation-oriented 
personnel, etc.). Finally, the actual execution and transfer of the new technology consist 
of a challenge as to what method or mechanism to choose and how to pursue the 
transfer. Overall, a properly planned, managed and executed continuous internal 
technology transfer provides benefits related to R&D efficiency and precision as well as 
securing quality throughout the process. Further, to improve the overall R&D utilization 
and commercialization efforts, it was clear that simply focusing on the transfer event in 
itself is not enough. One example thereof is the importance of product developers’ pre-
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knowledge about ongoing and planned technology projects, knowledge that affects their 
willingness to adopt the new technology. 
Paper VII also reviews the management of technology development, concluding that one 
major reason for not adopting new technology into product projects is bad timing. This 
implies that technology development often is late. On the other hand, it was also found 
that a typical technology development project often was de-staffed and prolonged – 
though with a constant project deliverable. Paper VII pinpoints managerial actions 
aimed at improving the interaction between technology development and product 
development, actions that are categorized in three areas: synchronization efforts, 
managing the transfer scope, and managing the actual transfer. Examples of approaches 
are to increase the implementation focus of the technology developers through, for 
example, development and documentation of more alternative concepts, to increase the 
number of information channels for spreading the results, to include cost estimates, and 
to conduct more system tests. 
D.2. MANAGING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT SCOPE 
The balance between technology development and product development has been a 
matter of debate for quite some time, emphasized by the Japanese companies’ product 
development strategy during recent decades. The issue relates to the degree of 
technological maturity and the risk that companies can take in their product 
development projects, and what development ought to be handled separately. 
Sharing technology between R&D projects 
Companies having a portfolio of products based on a common base of technology need 
to address the issue of effectively sharing technology and components, in order to 
optimize the technological content or degree of newness. Paper II approached the 
research issue concerning “what the managerial difficulties related to sharing technology 
between R&D projects might be”. The management issues dealt with in Paper II are 
related to leveraging previous project experiences and technology through the reuse of 
existing solutions – with the aim of reaching a desired level of technology or component 
commonality between different projects. 
Previous research has primarily dealt with the technical issues of transferring and reusing 
parts across different projects and products. However, this study concluded that the issue 
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of parts sharing is much more complex – involving organizational, strategic, 
technological, cost, and support systems issues as well. Acquiring knowledge through 
parts sharing is effective in terms of cost, lead time, and quality. However, it should also 
be noted that the sharing of parts also shifts focus for the engineers. This shift means that 
they work less with re-development of solutions or parts that already exist, and more 
with selection and integration of existing parts and with the unique (potentially of greater 
customer value and of a more daunting character) development tasks in the project. 
Overcoming difficulties of parts sharing facilitates and accelerates R&D processes, while 
at the same time it decreases the cost of internal transfer of technology as one channel 
for the necessary knowledge acquisition. Hence, the internal transfer or sharing of parts 
was found not only to be an engineering issue, but also to be of great importance for 
management. 
Responding to the research issue, it can be concluded that the managerial difficulties 
related to sharing of new technology are numerous, ranging from technological 
challenges to cost, organizational, strategic, and support system issues. An example 
thereof is that the commonality issue is delayed until late in the R&D project, making 
sharing of parts troublesome. In order to fully answer the research issue, a wider picture 
needs to be drawn, involving other industries and parts sharing opportunities. 
Evaluation of new R&D methods 
Paper IV approached the research issue termed “how companies can apply and evaluate 
new prototyping methods in R&D”. This paper reviews challenges related to the 
evaluation of new prototyping methods in general, and the use of VR in particular, with 
the aim of accelerating R&D processes. 
Evaluating different prototyping methods consists of reviewing the learning, investment, 
and security related to the traditional methods in use, as opposed to the potential 
benefits and the associated risk of the identified new methods. Since new methods 
continue to arise, this is not to be taken opportunistically, but as a certain process or way 
of working with identifying, evaluating, and matching new prototyping methods with the 
demands and characteristics internally. The evaluation and matching are a complex issue, 
involving not only a separate evaluation of the method as such, but also the task of 
testing the new method in the most appropriate domain (e.g. technology development, 
product development, engineering) and project phase (e.g. earlier or later in the cycle). 
The benefits sought seem primarily to be a reduction of project lead-time and, 
secondarily, to reduce the project cost and to increase the product quality. New 
prototyping methods in R&D are largely visual within the application of IT – i.e. VR 
visualization techniques, haptic models, IT expert systems. Hence, product designers and 
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management need to continuously address the evaluation and application of new 
prototyping methods in order to stay on the edge, potentially by using a process for how 
to handle new method evaluations. 
In the studied case, they chose to pre-test a new method (based on a potential 
prototyping exchange of full-scale clay models for virtual reality) in the technology 
development phase, instead of increasing the uncertainty of product development. The 
evaluation of new prototyping methods was seen as advantageously pre-tested in the less 
time-pressured environment of technology development. It was concluded that the 
specific clay model substitution was not possible in the late design phase where it was 
applied; instead, the prototyping method would possibly be more suitable as a 
complement in this phase but as a substituting technology in the earlier phases. Hence, 
the choice of matching the characteristics of the method with process stages seems to be 
essential when applying new methods, and ought to be given careful attention. Further, 
structured methodology and related potential dimensions for evaluating new prototyping 
methods were developed, involving dimensions such as cost, feedback time, 
representativeness, and knowledge-building capabilities. 
Approaching the research issue, Paper IV presents a structured evaluation procedure for 
new prototyping methods, involving dimensions such as knowledge-building capability 
(e.g. geometrical features, physical attributes), representativeness, feedback time, and 
management link. This methodology might be further developed in order to capture a 
wider range of methods than prototyping to evaluate. 
R&D project scope 
Returning to the issue of managing technological newness and risk in R&D projects, 
Paper V develops and pre-tests a new visualization tool and methodology to aid in this 
process. The research issue approached was “how the R&D project scope can be 
managed in a structured and continuous manner throughout project execution”. The 
issues dealt with in this paper relate to the continuous management of R&D project 
scope, a perspective where reviews and monitoring could be handled in a more visualized 
and structured manner, supported by a specific developed method. 
The challenge for project and top managers approached in this study is the dynamic and 
continuous management of project scope, i.e. how to choose among different contents, 
how to communicate the choices, and how to bring structure to such potentially infected 
discussions. The benefits sought are to increase R&D investment precision by focusing 
on the most vital content and thereby reducing the risk of unwanted R&D cuts or 
spending, and to assist project managers in the daily content decisions. It is also 
beneficial to be able to communicate the project scope, vertically as well as horizontally, 
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in a structured and presentable way. Hence, the method and tool developed affect the 
review and monitoring process of R&D projects, as well as strengthening the 
surrounding support systems. 
Previous research has concluded that having a well-balanced content is of critical 
importance for project success. It was also noted that in many cases there is an ongoing 
battle of creeping specifications, resulting in a constant change of project content in 
terms of technology. However, few managerial tools are available to guide project 
managers to view, analyze, and make decisions regarding technical content throughout 
the project execution. In order to be able to make such decisions, the tools developed, 
termed ‘R&D content graphs’, were based on five dimensions identified as influencing 
R&D project scope. These dimensions were (as adapted for technology development 
projects): strategic fit, knowledge-building capabilities, implementation possibilities, 
interdependencies, and technology uncertainty. The tools’ predictive value was also pre-
tested, indicating potential actions for project managers to consider. 
Responding to the research issue, Paper V presents a detailed, pilot-tested, and 
structured tool for managing R&D project scope. The tool is built up from five 
dimensions: knowledge-building capability, implementation possibilities, 
interdependencies, technology uncertainty, and strategic fit. It is targeted for use by the 
management team during the execution of R&D projects. This tool represents one of 
potentially many ways of working deliberately with R&D project scope. Further studies 
might be directed towards applying this method in different contexts and covering the 
portfolio level as well. 
To summarize, managing technology development and product development involves 
several different dimensions, ranging from choices regarding introduction of new 
methods, and individual R&D project balancing, to overall portfolio management of 
R&D efforts. Hence, pursuing a certain balance of R&D holds high operational and 
strategic importance. 
Remark on findings 
The purpose of this thesis was to explore management of R&D processes with special 
attention to technology development, product development, and their interplay. This was 
done by studying aspects of two main categories – managing internal organizational 
interfaces and management of technology development and product development scope. 
The aspects studied have concerned early stages of product development, organizational 
forms of R&D, the interplay between technology development and product 
development, the sharing of technology between R&D projects, the evaluation of new 
R&D methods, and the R&D project scope. 
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D.3. ELABORATION OF MANAGERIAL APPROACHES 
This section elaborates upon a potential sixth generation of R&D and concludes with a 
discussion of relevant future research issues in this field. 
Towards sixth-generation R&D management 
Throughout the five identified R&D generations, the complexity of R&D has continually 
expanded. Drivers of complexity have been, for example, the need to take more aspects 
into account (e.g. interoperability, industrial design, environmental, manufacturability, 
and after-market considerations), the demand to cooperate and interact with more actors 
outside the traditional R&D departments (e.g. with marketing and manufacturing 
functions, with suppliers, competitors, and distributors), and the necessity of efficient and 
effective commercialization of new technologies (e.g. timely, efficient deliveries of new 
products with predicted quality). The need for taking more aspects into account is driven 
by product and technology complexity; the demand to cooperate with more actors is 
driven by larger technological investments and rational specialization; and the necessity 
of efficient and effective commercialization of new technology is driven by rate-of-return 
demands and the cost of being late. Hence, facing this rising complexity challenge, 
management of R&D is predicted to take on a set of new working methods resulting in a 
new identifiable generation. The route forward involves issues of a more-of-the-same 
character; i.e. it is likely that there will be a continuous expansion of the complexity of 
R&D driving an increased number of aspects to integrate and actors to involve. 
However, apart from this evolution, a more radical shift is predicted to characterize the 
sixth generation of R&D management. This shift towards sixth generation of R&D 
management is predicted to return to the roots, i.e. back to the purpose of the first 
generations corporate research labs, one pursuing more radical innovations. One could 
see this as a re-focus towards the research part of research and development. The 
corporate research labs as such are not predicted to resurface, instead the re-focus is 
taking on other approaches. The bases for this new shift or new set of approaches are a 
broader multi-technology base for high-tech products and a more distributed technology-
sourcing structure. There will be a palette of technology-sourcing strategies available, e.g. 
corporate research labs, internal corporate venturing, technology company acquisitions, 
intellectual property acquisitions, corporate venture capital, joint ventures, independent 
research groups or networks, and internally driven R&D (cf. Granstrand and Sjölander, 
1990). The strategic choices are related, for example, to the R&D intensity of the firm, 
the industry context, and the business strategies. 
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The multi-technology aspects refer to products consisting of a broader technology basis, 
e.g. from basic mechanical products to infotainment products building also on biotech, 
telematics, and software functioning in a broader system delivering also related services. 
Traditional networks of companies (automotive, telecom, etc.) are thereby not sufficient 
to deliver these new kinds of products, instead new alliances and cooperation need to be 
established cross borders and based on functions instead of technology – increasing the 
demands on companies’ combinatory capabilities. Much of the breakthrough research 
will not be a result of one company’s lab efforts, instead breakthroughs will be based on 
joint efforts from loosely tied networks of smaller players driven more of pure interest 
than profits. In a way, early examples strengthening this view is evident from the 
independent programmers contributing to the Linux operating system, powerful enough 
to challenge the prime example of a de facto standard  - Microsoft’s Windows system. 
The need for companies to keep up with, tap into, and stay connected with the research 
efforts around the world is even more accentuated. This means that the research part of 
R&D in the long run weakens its solid ties to one company, merely being part of a larger 
ecosystem. There have been several attempts targeted at development alliances, now the 
turn has come to niche-based alliances also within the research efforts, involving actors 
as disperse as the Universities, independent freelancers, temporary interest groups, and 
competitors. The knowledge about ongoing research efforts and their potential 
implications and results may also lead to daring to have greater flexibility in the 
development cycle, thereby increasing their precision. 
 
Figure 1: Sixth generation of R&D management: global, connected, and nimble research efforts in a multi-
technology context. 
 
This shift is conducted with the aim of increasing the likelihood of recognizing, joining, 
and developing breakthroughs affecting whole industry segments. It is also a stylized fact 
that when predicting the future, the business impact of technological changes is 
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overestimated in the short run, while underestimated in the longer run as wildcards20 
occur more frequently with a larger impact than would be expected. Hence, there is a 
larger risk/reward ratio than evident in the earlier generations of R&D that now need to 
be taken into account. Within this new kind of R&D system, new opportunities or 
companies will be formed, functioning as intermediaries for the research efforts towards 
the potential users or developers. Those distributed intermediaries might function as 
marketing channels for the research efforts, as segment information providers, and as 
seekers of new application areas. Managing this multi-technology, multi-project network 
will be a daunting task. 
In sum, the sixth generation of R&D management is expected to re-focus the research 
part, and to enlarge and enhance the capabilities by connecting to loosely tied multi-
technology research networks. The pursuit of breakthroughs will take on other 
organizational approaches and open up for new players in the arena. In short, “chance 
favors only the prepared mind”21. 
Remark on R&D generations 
The notion of R&D generations is a difficult term, especially since most companies 
constitute a mixture of the generations and since the relevant time period for them most 
likely differs depending on industry segment, demographics, company age, research 
intensity, legislation demands, etc. Hence, the question could be asked: what constitutes 
a generation, and why is the term generation useful to depict? My experiences are that 
the concept behind generations is easy to grasp and communicate, points to different 
types of approaches with related pros and cons, and describes in some senses an 
evolution within the area – all with the aim of assisting companies to improve their R&D 
capabilities, and to develop a common language for researchers and companies to work 
with. It is important to realize that the notion of R&D generations is one way of 
communicating different management approaches under certain conditions and contexts. 
                                                 
20 A wildcard represents an event with low probability of occurrence which, if it occurs, has a dramatic 
impact. Wildcards and their impact have been studied by, for example, the Institute for the Future in San 
Francisco. 
21 Citation from Louis Pasteur. 
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Introducing the cluster approach 
This section is of a more normative nature, providing my own thoughts upon managerial 
approaches to R&D processes, a section that is also focused on potential solutions. It is 
worth noting that the examples of actions given here are not intended to provide answers 
to all the issues mentioned in this thesis, but merely to shed some light and illustrate 
aspects of R&D management actions that might be worth pursuing. In view of the 
previously identified research issues in the thesis, the proposed approaches and 
perspectives in this section are based on the following problems (cf. Paper IV and VII): 
• Technology development efforts tend to be fragmented, i.e. initiated, managed, 
and communicated within the respective function or department, resulting in late 
system integration and testing and in a risk of R&D inertia. Further, the interplay 
between technology development and product development tends to be 
overlooked and transfer issues not pinpointed, potentially resulting in a lower 
level of R&D utilization than is needed. 
• Technology development tends to focus excessively on the core technology in 
question, lacking enough evaluation, documentation, and/or analysis of alternative 
concepts and/or supportive technologies. This might result in a narrative phase of 
technology development, potentially complicating effective implementation in 
new product projects. 
• Technology development experiences the “rubberband” effect of resources on 
behalf of the closer-to-market product development, resulting in a misbalance of 
R&D efforts, and in technology solutions often being late and down-prioritized. 
This situation endangers technology-based companies’ long-term survival and 
competitiveness. 
These problems reside chiefly within the fifth generation of R&D, facing the system 
integration challenge and the need for a timely and synchronized total R&D effort. The 
managerial approaches mentioned below ought to minimize the negative effects of 
internal organizational boundaries and introduce techniques assisting management of the 
overall R&D scope. 
Facing the upcoming challenges, companies need to industrialize, manage and link the 
technology development phase in a tighter manner, and also to structure and improve 
the early phases of product development to evaluate, incorporate, and pursue rapid 
integration of targeted technologies. Manufactured products of today are complex 
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systems products22, consisting at their core of a number of different technologies, where 
features and functions work across the traditional functional divisions (e.g. motor, cab, 
chassis, transmission, etc.). The need for all these technologies to be properly integrated 
in order to function as a coherent whole is not questioned, resulting in companies 
establishing teams for systems engineering tasks and packaging of components and sub-
technologies. What have also been noted, following the product-platform perspective, 
are the strengths and potential residing in the intelligent configuration of a set of 
technologies, possibly leading to new offers and innovations.  
However, this potential is not appropriately exploited by working along the traditional 
functional divisions, only to be challenged later with the systems integration tasks. An 
alternative way of working with technology development tasks is to move the system 
integration tasks further upstream, by introducing technology development projects that 
cut across disciplines. Thereby, greater attention would also be given to the 
implementation issues, forcing a perspective wider than one’s own technology 
performance. Further, respective technology development efforts tend to be exposed to 
changes in budgets, having trouble defending the appointed resources. It is widely 
recognized that assigning a few hours a week to some fuzzy ongoing technology 
development is common practice – whether or not the hours have been put in. Hence, it 
is suggested that larger clusters of technology development efforts should be created. 
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Exhibit 14: Traditional approach versus the cluster approach for managing technology development (grey 
circles indicate technology development efforts). 
 
                                                 
22 A systems product can also be seen as consisting of the company’s whole offer to the customer, i.e. 
including for example service aspects, financial solutions, guarantee offer, and so on. 
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Exhibit 14 indicates an approach termed “traditional” and another termed the “cluster” 
approach. The traditional approach illustrates a scenario where each technology 
development effort is managed, staffed, and budgeted within the respective department. 
These individual efforts are then aligned with the overall functional strategy, to be 
incorporated in product development. The cluster approach takes a cross-functional 
strategy, gathering technology development efforts around the customer-driven features. 
These clusters have their own budget, steering group and staffing, and are then cluster-
wise aligned with the overall strategy. 
Describing the cluster approach in more detail, the clusters cut across disciplines working 
with, for example, the function of passenger safety, where all efforts – no matter where 
these are functionally organized – should be directed by one steering group in control of 
the appointed budget. This steering group should be able to acquire the necessary 
resources internally or externally, and should also be in charge of directing the whole 
cluster’s efforts toward the strategic goals, with respect to technology achievements and 
time frames, of the company. Having a critical mass of efforts within one area would be 
easier to defend and communicate internally, and easier to direct strategically (via for 
example R&D content graphs), and would also allow for reallocation of resources within 
the group. For example, it would be possible for the safety cluster to avoid having 
persons work sporadically within some projects; instead, the potential of having those 
persons work within more projects would allow greater focus. Further, the allocation 
decisions, whether of staffing or budgeting or otherwise, would be delegated to the 
cluster itself, attaining greater flexibility. Using the cluster approach would potentially 
result in less fuzzy de-staffing and prolonging of technology development, achieving a 
more synchronized total R&D effort that cuts across disciplines. In sum, the benefits of 
the cluster approach are: 
• Communicability 
• System focus and leveraging synergies 
• Strategic alignment 
• Monitoring and staffing situation 
Another action suggested to approach the fragmentation of technology development is 
to pursue a more centralized procedure for presenting, communicating, and reviewing 
relevant, non-classified information about planned, ongoing, and finished projects for the 
company network. By involving and notifying a greater number of people, the feedback 
loop is strengthened and the overall awareness of where the company is heading is 
improved. This would ease the transfer stage and lessen the potential Not-Invented-Here 
syndrome. Another action that might assist the likelihood of a transfer of the results is to 
demand suggestions for suitable introduction-time targets and likely products for the new 
technology, all to raise the implementation awareness. When it comes to raising the 
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quality of the technology development results, the development of fallback solutions or 
other alternative concepts would save time downstream. It might be necessary to state 
the minimum number of alternative concepts, or at least a potential fallback solution, 
that ought to be considered and documented before finishing the work. One potentially 
fruitful procedure, which would also alleviate frequent changes of project staff, would be 
to work with a visualized technology choice tree, indicating the choices made in the 
project and why those choices have been made (similar to a technology roadmap). 
In conclusion, the importance of considering technology development and product 
development simultaneously is crucial, avoiding unnecessary suboptimizations and 
potential undermining of companies’ competitiveness. Further, communicating and 
linking R&D effectively to the rest of the company network is of utmost importance, 
especially with regard to timing issues, scope, and overall strategy. 
Future research 
Studying management issues is complex and often difficult to grasp. It is my belief that a 
healthy interaction between practitioners and academics is the route to travel when 
advancing in this field. Upcoming managerial issues related to R&D seem to be 
connected with the heavy investment needs for advancing technology development, 
pushing alliances and mergers that result in managing geographically and potentially also 
culturally dispersed R&D activities. This challenge is similar to the discussion of 
dispersion versus dedication following Paper IV, an integration challenge that now seems 
even more evident. Specific examples of future research topics within this area are: 
Integrating and balancing technology development and product development efforts, 
considering involvement not only of suppliers, but also of competitors and 
complementary partners in offering a total service. What effect might the larger scope of 
R&D have on technology development speed, transfer of knowledge, and overall system 
integration effectiveness? What potentially new integration barriers might be found in 
this structure – e.g. can suppliers be utilized as bearers of knowledge throughout a R&D 
cycle, and what managerial difficulties may that bring? 
Second, the issue, dealt with in Paper II, of reaching economy- of-scale benefits also in 
the product development phase calls for intelligent commonality policies and practices, 
avoiding cannibalization and erosion of brands. Altogether, the need and use of long-
term scenario planning to face heavy technology investments and to achieve distinct 
brand values are of utmost importance. Yet, as always, long-term planning and actions 
must be complemented by short-term flexibility in order to manage the rapid changes of 
today’s market conditions and technology integration hallmarks. Specific examples of 
future research topics within this area are: 
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How can long-term planning be complemented by short-term flexibility in an efficient and 
effective manner? Under what contingencies is a certain process model applicable to work 
with? How can inherently different product brands utilize the same set of basic technology 
without eroding the values while maximizing the cost benefits and other gains? 
Third, the R&D function needs not only to incorporate product features and enhance the 
production capabilities. A wider range of responsibilities and considerations must be 
envisaged already during the R&D phase. Issues of serviceability, financial solutions, 
functional development and sales, marketability, and distribution channels emerge – 
altogether resulting in R&D that yields, not products, but total offerings and packaged 
solutions for the current and future customer base. Fourth and finally, alongside the 
above challenges, the innovativeness and renewal of the firm (see Paper VI) need to be 
approached deliberately, using procedural, human, and organizational mechanisms in a 
proper manner. Specific examples of future research topics within these two areas are: 
How can established companies utilize organizational approaches for probing new 
offerings to the market, and how can the R&D function operate while taking greater scope 
into consideration? 
In sum, the R&D capabilities ought to address also inter-firm potentials and 
collaborations, to widen in scope in terms of developing new concepts, and to 
deliberately work with the long-term renewal of the firm. Further, more future research 
topics might also be related to continue the work of the sixth-generation of R&D 
management, involving issues of, for example, strategic R&D decision making in a multi 
sourcing context. 
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